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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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PROGRESS ON PDRY-YAR UNITY REPORTED

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Feb 80 pp 10, 11

[Text] The opposition National Democratic Front last week said that it had reached agreement with North Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh on the formation of a new coalition government. The statement was the most significant in a series of events which suggest that some progress has been made on a programme to unite conservative North Yemen with its Marxist Southern neighbour.

The prospect of unity between the two states, which only a year ago were at war has alarmed some officials in the West. The crisis-laden atmosphere created by the invasion of Afghanistan has nurtured fears of a fresh attempt by the Soviet Union to strengthen its position in the southwest corner of the Arabian peninsula.

These apprehensions have gained weight from the disclosure that North Yemen has received military supplies and assistance from the Soviet bloc. Carter administration officials said that President Saleh's government turned to Moscow for arms after Saudi Arabia held up delivery of a \$500 million military package offered by the US during the Yemen war last year.

This is however only one interpretation of changes in North Yemeni policy over the past 12 months. The quiet development of ties between North Yemen and China, for instance, indicates that it is extremely premature to conclude that North Yemen is about to slip into Moscow's orbit.

Relations have certainly cooled between North Yemen and its traditional ally and financier, Saudi Arabia; but in this newsletter's view, the most important growing influence in North Yemen is not the USSR but Iraq. Through its External Development Fund, Iraq has begun pumping \$300 million over five years into North Yemen's economy, equivalent to 5 per cent of the country's GNP, for that period, according to latest estimates; it is also building a new airport in the port of Hodeyda.

Iraq, together with Saudi Arabia, was the architect of the cease-fire which ended inter-Yemen hostilities and is a proponent of the unity programme. These moves added greatly to Baghdad's prestige at a time when Iraq was emerging from its isolation to put itself forward as a moderate candidate for leadership of the Gulf.

A political and diplomatic thrust by the Soviet Union into North Yemen would not only damage Iraq's prestige, it would alarm the regime in Baghdad, which is trying to keep superpower influence in the Gulf – and by extension in the Arabian peninsula – to a minimum.

Reconciliation talks resumed last month

The announcement of the agreement on a coalition government was made by the leader of the National Democratic Front, Sultan Ahmed Omar, in Aden, the South Yemeni capital. He said that negotiations with President Saleh's government began in June last year and were resumed last month.

Three days earlier, President Saleh announced that later this year North Yemen would hold its first general election since it became a republic in 1962. He did not state whether seats would be allocated on a tribal basis or whether political parties would be authorised.

Mr Omar said however that it had been agreed that laws forbidding the formation of political movements in North Yemen would be repealed and that the projected coalition would prepare the election. The legislature would endorse a new constitution, also to be drafted by the coalition government, he said. He added that the first step towards the implementation of the accord would be the release of political prisoners and the cessation of hostilities between government forces and troops loyal to the National Democratic Front.

It was these troops which bore the brunt of the fighting in last year's clashes; supported by South Yemeni regulars, they seized three border towns in North Yemen (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, March 5, 1979). Observers were surprised at the time by Saudi Arabia's apparent unwillingness to intervene in the hostilities and the even-handed manner in which it criticised both the Sanaa and Aden governments and called for a ceasefire.

This newsletter interpreted the moves as a Saudi gesture towards South Yemen at a time when the chief participants of the Baghdad summit were trying to rally all Arab states to an anti-Egyptian position. The gesture

looked like a tacit warning to North Yemen and confirmation of that came three weeks later, when North Yemen's pro-Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdullah al-Asnag, was dropped in a cabinet reshuffle, along with his close associate, Information Minister Mohamed Salem Basendoua. Last week, Mr Asnag also lost his post as Presidential Adviser.

The cabinet reshuffle was intended to pacify the National Democratic Front, a loose grouping of Nasserites, radical Baathists and other left-wing elements. But since the Front depends entirely on the support of the Aden government, no agreement involving it can be made to stick without Aden's approval.

There have meanwhile been other signs of *rapprochement* between North and South; although the timetable for implementing the five-point unification programme endorsed by Presidents Saleh and Abdul-Fattah Ismail is well behind schedule (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, April 9, 1979). It was agreed at a summit in Kuwait that a constitution for the unified state would be drafted within four months and elections be held within a further six months.

Agreements on posts, telephones and airspace

Despite the delay, President Saleh's envoy to a regular monthly meeting, held in Aden in November, said that the governments had agreed on a timetable for meetings of the unity committees envisaged by the summit. Talks were also going ahead on economic and trade cooperation, he said. Late in January, it was announced that the two countries would unify tariff rates for postal and telephone services and had agreed in principle to lift restrictions on the use of airspace by each other's national airlines.

In October last year, North Yemen sent its army chief of staff, Lieut-Col Abdulaziz al-Boraty, to attend celebrations marking the 16th anniversary of the departure of British troops from Aden. Talks have been held on unifying the armed forces. The atmosphere, in short, has improved greatly since the assassination of President Saleh's predecessor, Ahmed al-Ghashmi, and execution of South Yemen's President Salem Robaya al-Ali on charges of organising the murder.

South Yemen remains closely tied to the USSR, with which it signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation while President Ismail was in Moscow last October; a month later it initialled a similar treaty with East Germany's party leader Erich Honecker in Aden.

But there is no evidence that North Yemen is following the same line. As recently as February 5, President Saleh expressed continued support for the Islamic revolution in Iran; on the same day, a Chinese delegation arrived in Sanaa for talks on expanding bilateral trade. Not only is China a bitter ideological enemy of the USSR, it has made its position clear in the Gulf, where it has concluded an agreement setting up diplomatic relations with Oman.

Oman was criticised in a joint communique issued after Mr Honecker's visit to Aden for its "pro-imperialist" proposals to bring the US into a Gulf security arrangement.

While the future of North-South Yemen relations remains unpredictable, the flurry created by the arms deals between Sanaa and Moscow is a direct consequence of inappropriate action by the US. Suddenly alarmed by hostilities in what it perceives as a strategic area, Washington offered huge quantities of arms to a government which the CIA itself predicted would not last more than six months. Previously, the US had given every indication of regarding North Yemen as a remote and primitive backwater.

CSO: 4820

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

UAE-SUDANESE INVESTMENT COMPANY--Sudan and the UAE have agreed in principle to increase the capital of their Joint Investment Company from \$20 million to \$50 million, it was reported last week. The official UAE news agency said that it was also decided to set up two joint banks in collaboration with City Bank of India and with Banque Nationale de Paris. The agreements were reached during a five-day visit to Abu Dhabi by the Director of the Joint Investment Co, Dr Abdul Hafiz; he conferred with UAE Foreign Ministry officials about the activities of the company and projects it is financing in Sudan, the report said. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 11 Feb 80 p 15]

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ATTITUDE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN EXPLORED

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

Paris EST ET OUEST in French 1-29 Feb 80 pp 6-8

[Article by Branko Lazitch]

[Text] What was known about the Communist Party of Afghanistan before it seized power on 27 April 1978? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. No one was even aware of its existence.

For a long time, the communist parties of the neighboring countries, India, Iran, Turkey, etc., were little known. But at least it was known that they existed. Their date of birth was known: the Turkish CP and the Iranian CP were founded in 1920; and in 1921 the Indian CP was born abroad.

Nothing of the sort for the Communist Party of Afghanistan: for nearly 60 years--to go back to the founding of the Communist Internationale--to put it one way, the Afghan CP stood out because of its absence from the literature of the Communist Internationale, from that of the Soviet Union and from the writings of Western researchers.

Nothing is to be found in the Internationale's publications. The latter has held seven world congresses: the minutes have never mentioned the presence of an Afghan delegation at these congresses. Similarly there is nothing in the organ of the Communist Internationale, LA NOUVELLE REVUE INTERNATIONALE (The title of the French edition), which has been published in Prague since 1958 and which, since its first appearance, has written to a greater or lesser degree about all the communist movements in the world. In 1969, the Soviets held a world conference of communist parties in Moscow. Seventy-five parties sent delegations to the conference, including the Turkish CP, Iranian CP, Pakistani CP and that of India. Not a trace of the Afghan CP.

Soviet sources do not have much more to say about it. The last edition of the Soviet Grand Encyclopedia (Vol 2, 1970) contains a long article on Afghanistan: it does not mention a single political party. The only thing

the article says is: "In 1965, work was started in Afghanistan on preparation of the first law on political parties." This same Encyclopedia publishes a Supplement every year with articles devoted to every country: Afghanistan appears in the Supplement regularly; however, up to 1978, there was not one line about the CP of that country.

Westerners, left to their own devices, could not find out very much about the existence and activities of the Communist Party of Afghanistan. The best collection in the West on the international communist movement, "Yearbook on International Communist Affairs," published by the Hoover Institution since 1966, has never devoted a single line to this problem; the heading Communist Party of Afghanistan appears for the first time in 1978, the year the communists seized power.

This total absence of proof of the existence of the Communist Party of Afghanistan for 60 years, according to "formal bourgeois" logic, could lead to the conclusion that this party did not exist. The power coup on 27 April 1978 pulverized that hypothesis. This calls for an observation: the communists have a great capacity for "concealing the truth," as Lenin had taught them in "Communism's Childhood Disease: Leftism"; and a question: what are the reasons for this silence? There is no easy answer. Here is one hypothesis: Afghanistan was for Moscow the model of friendship shown to a neighboring country, a model at one and the same time because of the duration of this policy (from 1919 to 1978) and because of the guarantees given, including one which reportedly consisted of the nonexistence of this weapon par excellence of meddling in the domestic life of a foreign country: the CP remotely controlled from Moscow. The day that Moscow gave proof to the contrary, 27 April 1978, it was already too late in Afghanistan to protest about Moscow's felony.

The Beginnings of the Communist Movement

The first activists of bolshevism in the so-called "colonial and semi-colonial" countries had two origins: one group consisted of renegades from nationalism, the other of followers of socialism. In Afghanistan, they were of the second kind. In the 1920's, certain Afghans went to Soviet Russia in search of "real socialism," as it is now put. However, up to the end of World War II, this process involved initiatives by individuals.

The first appearance of a politically structured left dates from the first relatively free parliamentary elections in this country, in 1949. Out of a total of 120 seats, about 50 were won by men of the left. The left issued its first newspapers: LA VOIX DU PEUPLE and LA PATRIE; however, the royal family, frightened by such a development, decided to react before the next elections scheduled for 1952. The principal spokesmen of the left were arrested and their newspapers banned.

The second attempt at liberalization took place under King Mohammad Zahir and lasted longer, nearly 10 years. The new Constitution was promulgated

in October 1964; and two parliamentary elections were held in the prescribed legal periods, in 1965 and 1969. In 1965, a law on the press became effective which promised its liberalization. At that time, the first newspaper which was the organ of the communist elements, KHALQ (sometimes translated PFOPLE, sometimes as MASSES), made its appearance. This weekly had six issues, April-May 1966. Its editorials: "The principal stake at present of the class struggle at the world level, a struggle undertaken as the result of the Great October Socialist Revolution, is the choice between international socialism and international capitalism."

The religious leaders reacted quickly to this profession of faith and demanded an investigation of this newspaper, which was accused of being anti-Islamic, anticonstitutional and antimonarchist. The newspaper defended itself against these accusations in the communist manner (when the party is eager at any price to maintain legal status): it was not opposed to the principles of Islam; it was for respect for the rights contained in the Constitution; and it recognized the need for the monarchy "in the present stage." The hostility of the Islamic leaders was stronger and on 23 May the newspaper was banned.

This ban had settled the problem of the newspaper but not that of the communist movement of which it was the voice. In fact, in 1965 there communist elements had formed a political party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, with Mohammad Taraki as secretary-general. Some of the party leaders offered themselves as candidates for the 1965 parliamentary elections: Taraki was defeated; however, another leader, Babrak Karmal, was elected deputy. A known activist at the time he was a student, a confirmed Marxist-Leninist, an orator of quality; he stood out as one of the dominant figures of the Afghan parliament.

When the repression against the party newspaper took place, the opinions of Taraki and Babrak Karmal concerning what tactics to follow differed. The latter persisted in pleading on behalf of the use of legal means, in the first place the parliament of which he was to remain a member until 1973. As a faithful Leninist, he was eager to make use of the opportunities offered by the regime in place; effectively, he could boast of having established points of support among the students, intellectuals and young officers, without forgetting to make close contacts with the Soviet Union.¹ On the contrary, Taraki left the political scene and devoted himself to the building of the party's clandestine apparatus, particularly in the sectors with which his competitor, Babrak, concerned himself very little: the workers and teachers in the provinces.

The split between these two men occurred in 1967. The visible sign of this was the appearance of the newspaper, PARCHAM (THE FLAG), the mouthpiece of the Babrak faction, whose first issue carried the date of 14 May 1968. From that point on, two rival factions acted separately, each bearing the name of the newspaper which was its mouthpiece, Khalq, on the one side, and Parcham, on the other.

The split lasted nearly 10 years. However, following the coup d'etat (without the spilling of blood), which was organized by former Prime Minister Daoud, on 17 July 1973 and which resulted in dissolution of parliament and the abdication of the king, the legal possibilities of acting narrowed appreciably; this facilitated the rapprochement between the two factions. Finally, in July 1977, Babrak negotiated the merger of his Parcham with the Khalq.

During this decade of split, the two leaders attempted to maintain ties with the Soviets; and both also sought contacts with the international communist movement. Thus it was that in November 1976 Babrak sent a message to the Communist Party of Australia telling them among other things: "No problem can break the spirit and the will of our party's communists." And Taraki asserted in a message to the Hindu CP on the occasion of its 11th congress: "Long live the unity of the international communist movement based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism!"

The Communist Victory

The last two coups d'etat--before the communist victory--were without bloodshed: in September 1953 and July 1973. When the communists set out to seize power, in a brief period they incited three bloodbaths: on 27 April 1978, President Daoud and about 30 members of his family were massacred; on 16 September 1979, communist President Taraki (with his family) was assassinated by Hurin; on 27 December 1979, communist President Amin (with his three wives and 20 children) were in turn struck down. This time the executioner was the Soviet army which installed Babrak Karmal at the head of the state and party.

Following their seizure of power, on 27 April 1978, the communists formed a 21-member government, 11 of whom came from the Khalq and 10 from the Parcham. The number one man in the Khalq, Taraki, was appointed prime minister and the number one man in the Parcham, Babrak, vice prime minister. As in cases of this kind of Marxist-Leninist enterprise, the seizure of power was carried out in the name of the proletariat; however, the proletariat was not observed participating in the action nor are there any proletarians in the government.

In spite of the 100 percent communist composition of the government, Taraki had the insolence to maintain that power was not in the hands of the communists. On 9 June, he once again said that his People's Democratic Party was very respectful of the principles of Islam, popular traditions, private property and the policy of nonalignment. He added: "We consider ourselves reformers and progressive democrats. Marxism-Leninism is not a formula which we are supporting and applying."

One month earlier, on 9 May, Taraki had declared that the most important reform to make was agrarian reform.

The Soviets probably did not want the new communist government to skip any stages of the revolution nor for the pace during the first few years to be more rapid than in eastern Europe in 1945-1947. However, this process was stepped up as the result of the settling of accounts between Afghan communist leaders. In July 1978, Babrak was sent as ambassador to Prague, his brother to Islamabad and his mistress, minister of social affairs and tourism, was appointed to Belgrade. This was the only government purge which did not produce any bloodletting.

The events in Afghanistan continue to give disagreeable surprises to Asians and Westerners. They have produced the same effect among Afghan communists themselves. To begin with, they surprised the man who was their first victim, President Daoud. The latter had told American journalist C.L. Sulzberger in 1957: "I can assure you that my country will be the last in the world to become communist." He must have been caught totally unaware by the bloody power coup on 27 April 1978. Of the 21 ministers of the new communist government, 11 already were performing duties in the Daoud government: three officers, two professors from Kabul University, one journalist from the state radio and five administration officials. There was no danger of the Afghan communists showing the same "bourgeoise" generosity with regard to their adversaries of yesterday.

Let us not forget this picturesque detail: Taraki had spent 2 years in Washington as the Afghan embassy's press attache, before being employed, from 1955-1963 in the American embassy in Kabul. His successor, Amin, had studied at Colombia University in New York City.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf.: "Afghanistan Under the Khalq," Louis Dupres, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, July-August 1979.
2. [No footnote 2 indicator appeared in the text] In 1923, L'Humanite Bookshop, in its collection called "Communist Library," published an "A Yearbook of Political, Economic and Social Work," which its authors had conceived as "a veritable breviary" of the militant. In it, one could quickly find much information about the world revolutionary movement.

The third part, titled "The Bourgeois States," on one page gave a brief monography which ended as follows: "Afghanistan is called upon to play a large political role. With Turkey, it constitutes the armed and fighting vanguard of the Moslem nationalist emancipation movement in Asia Minor and is marvelously situated like a lookout at the door of Hindustan to the northwest where British ferment is being manifested with ever increasing violence." (oc., p 362)

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Paris EST ET OUEST in French 1-29 Feb 80 pp 6-8

[Article by Georges Albertini]

[Text] On all sides there are questions about the reasons why the USSR invaded Afghanistan. As might have been expected, the most absurd answers are being offered, not from the Communist Party which is doing its job of justifying Moscow's policy, but from those who claim to constitute the "liberal" wing of the party, whose recognized head (largely the creation of the ignorant "media" of the middleclass), Jean Elleinstein, said that it was the Soviet which had imposed this occupation upon Leonid Brezhnev! One thinks he is dreaming when he listens to a communist, who should know communism as it is, in Moscow and Paris, and forego such nonsense. One thinks that he is dreaming, and nearly 40 years younger, when Stalin convinced Roosevelt that there were possibilities of reaching an understanding with him ("Uncle Joe") and that concessions should be made to him to prevent the "hardliners" of the Politburo from eliminating him! It was not until the death of the American president that, in a moment of lucidity, he sadly admitted that Stalin had probably duped him.

At least Roosevelt had some excuse, but when a communist member of the party to explain the occupation of Afghanistan again brings up the point that peaceful and aging Brezhnev had yielded to a kind of ultimatum from the army, there is reason for despair over the intelligence of the person who utters such a stupidity, which reveals his unconscious complicity with the worst aspects of Soviet policy. At this very moment, when Moscow is attempting to obscure something that is terribly clear and to justify the unjustifiable, such explanations can only help to keep Westerners from understanding what is tragically simple, namely that in this instance we are being confronted by the cynical and decidedly deliberate use of armed force to make another conquest, an undertaking in which the leadership apparatus of the USSR (whether he wears a vest or a general's tunic) is entirely united and responsible.

Why and How Far?

The search for causes does not end there for numerous penpushers who work for the written press and the no-less-numerous commentators of all the radio and television stations. Of course, I will leave it to the last to mention the poverty of the comments being made from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy of political personnel, in which ignorance, illusion and resignation lead to the adoption of a policy which is almost as perceptive as that of the democracies vis-a-vis Hitler in 1936-1939.

The question being asked by these "observers" (according to the hallowed expression) is why the USSR invaded Afghanistan and how far it intends to push its offensive. And each of them invents complicated or absurd explanations without relation to reality: moreover these observers have gone

to the ultimate point [summon]--and such persons are to be found at the top of the hierarchy--and are asking the grave question: does the USSR want war? Where and when?

This problem could not have been stated worse. Those who have followed the foreign policy of the USSR since 1945-1950, a period during which the world basically assumed the characteristics it now has, had no difficulty understanding the problem. Over the years, our friend Boris Souvarine, almost alone against everyone, as is customary, wrote in the small publication which he had founded on his return from the United States, L'OBSERVATEUR DES DEUX MONDES, that the USSR did not want war: it wished to continue its conquests politically. Of course, that did not keep it from advancing everywhere the West seemed incapable of stopping it.

Today, nothing has changed, despite the considerable increase in Soviet force. The USSR reckoned--and reckoned well--that it could transform Afghan popular democracy, which was born in 1978, into a satellite state like Czechoslovakia. Occupation being necessary to face up to Afghan nationalists who were waging war to overthrow the pro-Soviet government, the USSR went to work with powerful means (victory was at this price) and with a kind of insolent arrogance matching the disdain it professes for such a weak West.

Of course, contingent reasons pushed the Soviets into action in December 1979 rather than in March or April 1980. The two most important contingent reasons were born of the Afghan situation. The first of these was that the Amin regime itself was nourishing resistance by bloody and mad repression, a la Stalin or a la Pol Pot, which he was imposing on the country. The result was to threaten the country's very existence, and the USSR was no more ready to tolerate its disappearance than it was to accept the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The second contingent reason was that the selfsame Amin, in his own office on 26 December 1979, had assassinated the deputy chief of the MVD [ministry of internal affairs], Gen V.S. Paputin, who had gone to Kabul on a mission to prepare for the seizure of control of the country by the USSR. The entry of Soviet troops took place the following day: it was not a chance thing; but it was not the profound cause of the invasion. It merely triggered the invasion that day. In other words, let us say that it was Amin, in his folly, who permitted the USSR to create a fait accompli. But it was only able to do so because the fait accompli had been prepared for several months. If there had not been this pretext, it would have been easy to find another.

Of course, the real reason for Soviet occupation was that Moscow judged it to be practically without risk. And to the question: "How far?" the answer is: just as far as it is possible to advance without taking too many risks. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that Soviet leaders do not know just how far they will go, when and how. What is certain is that they will not make war, since they can advance without it.

What is also certain is that they will stop when the risks of a counter-attack seem too strong to them.

If a border conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan without too serious uncertainties could lead to improvement of the situation of the former and to weakening the latter, why would anyone be annoyed? If, on the other hand, it was shown that such a conflict could lead to too dangerous a situation, Sovietized Afghanistan would instantly stop. In short, the USSR will pattern its attitude on that of the West. If the West is still capable of reacting with resolution, Moscow will stop, consolidate its gains, will even propose an agreement (but it will give up nothing) and will await a favorable opportunity to begin again, there or elsewhere. If, on the contrary, the West is unable to react and continues to demand "explanations" from Moscow, a la French government (which implies that nothing was understood about Soviet policy, or that there was an acceptance deep down inside of the fait accompli, as others accepted Hitler's faits accomplis between 1933 and 1939), then no one should doubt that, whether in Asia or elsewhere, the Soviet offensive will continue, either with other occupations or with other efforts to change the map of the world to the benefit of Moscow.

It is not only up to the United States to speak out. Alas, it is also up to Europe, of which the least we can say, with the exception of the England of Mrs Thatcher, "Churchill in skirts," it is demonstrating the most discouraging passivity, born of an even more discouraging lack of understanding of what the Soviet regime and policy are all about.

Russia in Asia

What are the general lines of Soviet strategy in Asia?

It is too often forgotten that Asia is a continent of which the entire north is Soviet, from the Ural to Vladivostok. Since the 18th century, Russia has been an Asian power, and the Russia of Asia is indeed the only great colony which a white people still has today. Consequently, it is normal for the USSR to be as attentive to what is happening on a continent where it has several million square kilometers as it is to what is happening in Europe all along its western border.

That is the reason it has never resigned itself to the Chinese secession with respect to the international communist movement, such as was produced around 1960. It has never abandoned the hope of renewing certain ties with that country (as it succeeded in doing, for example, with Yugoslavia after the death of Stalin), in order one day to reestablish the unity of the communist world. To attain this objective, it has the obligation of progressively isolating China to one day induce it to come to terms. The fact that this objective has small chance of attainment for the moment does not mean anything. Soviet diplomacy does not have genius; however, it has what is perhaps better: patience and the art of seizing opportunities.

In any event, this objective is much more realistic than the one which would lead to a war in which total victory, we can imagine, would be almost impossible to win.

Soviet policy on the entire Indo-Chinese peninsula (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), with the spearhead constituted by the excellent Vietnamese army, proposes principally to lock up the southern border of China. The policy in Central Asia, which we have observed developing for several years, has its sights on the same goal, while at the same time pursuing specific objectives.

The USSR in Central Asia

Central Asia in the first place is made up of the principal parts of the Indian subcontinent, although the latter spills over toward the south. These parts are India and Pakistan. India, under the impetus of Indira Ghandi, has moved from the nonalignment practiced by Pandit Nehru to a policy of alliance with the USSR. Mme Ghandi's India is much more aligned with Soviet policy than Finland, and without the same rationale. Also, it is a matter of great concern to learn that the analyses of the French and Indian leaders on the world situation after the "Kabul coup" are similar.²

Pakistan, on the contrary, is quite distant from Soviet policy. Long close to the United States, it is China's ally and one of the Moslem countries most removed from the Marxist ideology prevailing in Moscow. Moreover, since the country is considered by Indira Ghandi to be India's principal enemy (for she seems never to have forgiven the rupture of the unity of India such as existed for several centuries), that can only complicate its relations with the USSR even more. If one remembers that Afghanistan (a satellite state) has never recognized the delineation of its border with Pakistan; that the Baluchis, more or less manipulated by Moscow, can threaten its southern border; that India has never accepted the fact that Kashmir was cut in two (the east for India, the west for Pakistan), one will easily conclude that the USSR has innumerable opportunities for creating incidents suited to the strengthening of its situation.

If the USSR were to strengthen itself in this region, the three states which would separate it from the Indo-Chinese peninsula: Bangladesh, Burma and Thailand, which, sapped by misery or the existence of forces of subversion strong enough now to cause entire provinces to escape the authority of the central government (if the term has any meaning in these states which are not like that), these three countries would not carry much weight. It would be useless to conquer them. They would align themselves almost of their own free will, if Western passivity continues to abandon them to their own forces.

It is enough to recall these notions of geopolitics to understand that the occupation of Afghanistan was a prelude to all actions in the direction of the south, east and even the west, the day that Iran accentuates certain

of its anti-Soviet positions. In fact, Afghanistan is a (difficult) route toward the western part of China, toward Pakistan, toward the Indian Ocean (a Soviet warplane departing from Kandahar is at least 1 hour from the Strait of Hormuz) and toward the Gulf, therefore, toward oil. Of course, no one imagines that the Soviet bear is going to swallow up all these territories in its terrible gullet. However, everyone can see, to make an old comparison with European history, that the possession of Afghanistan brings to mind the importance attached since the 18th century to possession of the quadrilateral of Bohemia. Its occupation by Hitler in 1938-1939 is, in comparison with the present situation, rich in significance, even if the Politburo reacts quite differently from the Fuhrer.

From Outer [interieure] Asia, which runs from Turkey to Suez and Baghdad, the USSR has nothing to fear. The Israeli-Arab conflict is an excellent pretext for it to be present without risk in the region. The USSR does not want it to degenerate into a serious conflict nor that peace be established. The present neither-peace neither-war situation is what suits it best, in any event what gives it as free a hand as possible to act in all the rest of the Asian continent, in accordance with the lines we have attempted very summarily to define.

I hope the reader will not take me to task for concluding with a comment which certain persons will say borders on sacrilege. If one considers the present seriousness of Asian questions, one cannot fail to be surprised at the weakness of Western reactions, setting aside Mr Carter, who needed 4 years to finally understand what Soviet policy is, and Mrs Thatcher who has understood it for a long time. However, therein is not the "scandal." It consists in seeing all these countries, which have remained nearly silent in the face of the invasion of a country larger than France, solemnly protest the banishment of Sakharov to Gorki. Not that it is a question of haggling over admiration for the courage and abnegation of this lay saint. But, in the final analysis, there are hundreds of "dissidents" for whom no one has said a word and, however cruel and inadmissible the sanction taken against him by abject dictators, what is this sanction compared to the occupation of Afghanistan by 100,000 Soviet soldiers? This comment is not in any manner intended as disassociation from those who are fighting for Sakharov's freedom. It is intended to show that the West does not always know how to discern the basics, the objectives of Soviet policy, which leads it to make more of a fuss over a distressing incident than an invasion. And it is understandable that the Soviets, comparing the relative weakness of the reactions against the occupation of Afghanistan and the indignation of the world in the face of Sakharov's deportation, are surprised. For once in agreement with them, we dare to write that their surprise is understandable.

FOOTNOTES

1. Whatever may be the opinion of Mr Karol, in the NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, one should not be surprised, as he is always wrong in such matters

about which he claims to be knowledgeable. However, the fact that Michel Poniatowski seems to be of this opinion is rather surprising.

2. This is explicitly evident from the documents published on the occasion of Giscard d'Estaing's visit to India.

Reaction of 'Brother Parties'

Paris EST ET OUEST in French 1-29 Feb 80 pp 11-13

[Text] TEMPS NOUVEAUX, a political weekly published in several languages in Moscow and carried to all the countries of the world by AEROFLOT, in its January 1980 issue published an article about which much ado was made about the gestures of solidarity of the communist parties with--allow us to quote--"the decision of the Soviet Union to respond to the request for assistance--including military assistance--from the Afghan government to repel armed interference from abroad."

Of course, at the head of those who approve of "the international assistance of the USSR to repel aggression and reestablish peace" are the communist parties of the countries of the socialist community; however, that is so self-evident that the author will pass over it without emphasis. On the other hand, the author wishes to point up the support of the communist parties outside the community.

He begins his review--his prize list--one might have guessed, with the CP of the United States:

"The Communist Party of the United States has published a statement signed by the national president, H. Winston, and the secretary-general, G. Hall, in which it is said that American imperialism had the intention of transforming Afghanistan into another outpost of preparations for war. The United States has 429 permanent bases abroad. Since the end of World War II, the United States has on 215 occasions used force or the threat of force against other countries, most of these actions having as their point of departure bases in foreign territories. American imperialism was insolently undermining the democratic victories of the peoples of Guatemala and Chile, even before those of Iran and other regions in the world. In Afghanistan, the Communist Party of the United States emphasizes, the macabre plans of U.S. imperialism were thwarted."

Decidedly, the French Communist Party is not the only one to practice a reverse kind of patriotism. For the American communists, too, their country is always in the wrong, in whatever circumstances, and, particularly when the Soviet Union finds itself involved in the affair. In any event, they might have said that the bases established by the United States almost everywhere in the world were at the request of governments suddenly frightened at the end of the war by the evident desire for political expansion (and, if necessary, military expansion) of the USSR. And they

also might have said that in many countries, particularly those which are directly involved today, the United States had in recent years abandoned many of these bases and had allowed many others to fall into disrepair--this certainly does not translate into a desire for aggression.

The second party quoted was the German Communist Party (DKP) which operates in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The PCF [French Communist Party] was quoted third; however, this party has the right to the greatest number of lines:

"More and more peoples are joining the struggle because they do not wish to resign themselves to their inhuman condition of inequality, misery, plunder. This statement appears in a declaration issued by the Politburo of the French Communist Party published on 5 January. However, imperialism does not yield its positions without a fight, this document notes. It uses methods which inflame tension. The United States is accelerating the arms race and increasingly has recourse in the various regions of the world to interference, pressure and intervention.

"With respect to the events in Afghanistan the PCF Politburo asserted, the Afghan people have been following a progressive path. American imperialism seeks, directly or indirectly, to oppose this popular movement, indeed to recover its lost positions. Denouncing this imperialist plot against Afghanistan, L'HUMANITE mentions the striking resemblance between the present campaign of lies and slander on the subject of Soviet aid to this country and those it is conducting against Iran, Kampuchea and Vietnam. Every time a country tears itself away from imperialism, the same voices are lifted in agreement, the newspaper notes."

L'HUMANITE is quoted again in the middle of the article:

"The principles of sovereignty, the right of peoples to self-determination, the statement of the PCF Politburo asserts, supposes the right of every country to request aid from an allied country to repel interference from abroad. Explaining the position of the French communists, L'HUMANITE recalls two important provisions of the UN Charter: the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state (Article 7) [as published] and the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense (Article 51). The second article does not contradict the first but on the contrary complements it, the newspaper observes, for it guarantees every state the possibility of defending itself against interference from the outside, to request aid from its allies."

The Austrian Communist Party is next. It states: "Since April 1978, Afghanistan has been the subject of practically undisguised military intervention perpetrated by armed bands of the large property owners operating from abroad...financed by U.S. dollars and equipped with Chinese arms."

A similar statement was made by the secretary-general of the CP of India, R. Rao.

Then, without apparent order, come the CP of Colombia and its organ, VOZ PROLETARIA ("Refusal to support the Afghan revolution, allowing it alone to face up to the forces of reaction and imperialist aggression would have meant condemning it to defeat, and this would have strongly affected the communist and national liberation movements."); the CP of Lebanon (secretary, N.A. Samad); those of Bangladesh, Venezuela (secretary, Jesus Faris: "By going to the assistance of Afghanistan, the USSR fulfilled its international duty."); the AKEL [expansion unknown] of Cyprus; the Unified Socialist Party of West Berlin; the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (organ, ATHTHA); Syria.

As for the other parties, the author limits himself to a quick mention:

"The communist parties of the following countries also took positions supportive of the objectives of the Afghan revolution: Brazil, Denmark, Israel, Indonesia, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, Panama, Peru, Turkey, Uruguay, the Philippines, Chile, Ecuador, South Africa, the Socialist Party of Australia, the Swedish Communist-Workers Party, etc."

The Recalcitrants

The article next takes up the communist parties which hesitated to openly approve the Soviet intervention. None is named; however, the author takes this occasion to give them a lesson in internationalism:

"In this context, the tendentious commentaries of certain press organs are sounding a discordant note. Their authors are presenting the events in Afghanistan and Soviet aid to this country in a false light, borrowing their 'arguments' from middleclass sources. That produces an impression which is all the more strange because they go beyond the official statements of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

"Specifically, this subject is at times presented in a way to lend credence to the idea that the situation which has been created around Afghanistan (as in certain similar cases which occurred in other regions) is due in equal measure to the United States and Soviet Union. Such a way of posing the problem is entirely incongruous, for it overlooks the essential point: the radical differences between the nature and objectives of the foreign policies of socialism and imperialism."

The difference is that "direct support is given to antigovernmental forces" in Afghanistan by the imperialists:

"Recognizing this, some CP's have, however, adopted an ambiguous position. On the one hand, they salute the Afghan revolution, express solidarity with it. What is more, they acknowledge that the acts of imperialism and of

those inspired by it, internal reaction and armed foreign aggressions seriously threatened the victories of the Afghan people and had led the country to the edge of catastrophe. They condemn the dictatorial regime of Amin, who had usurped power, and wish for the success of the new leadership of Afghanistan in its struggle for the protection of the revolution. On the other hand, however, these same parties are expressing doubts about the propriety and justification for USSR military aid to Afghanistan; some even describe it as being intervention which undermines the sovereignty of this country and the cause of world peace.

"In this instance, one has the right to ask the question: what, then, is international solidarity of revolutionaries? Does it only consist in giving moral and diplomatic support, in wishing verbally for success, or does it, in certain exceptional circumstances, suppose the giving of material aid, including military aid, all the more so when it is a question of evident, massive foreign interference?"

The Two Aspects of International Duty

The answer goes without saying. It is necessary to intervene. The author invokes historical precedents in support of his statement:

"The history of the revolutionary movement confirms the moral and political justification of such aid and support. This was the case, for example, in Spain, in the 1930's, in China in the 1920's and 1930's. Now that there is a system of socialist countries, it would, to say the least, be strange to deny the right to give such aid. In instances, when this extreme necessity appears, the USSR acts in full conformity with the standards of peaceful coexistence stipulated by international agreements. To refuse to take advantage of the opportunities the socialist countries have would, in fact, mean renunciation of fulfilling their international duty and lead the world to the day when imperialism could as it pleased stifle any revolutionary movement."

The text is clear. International duty has two faces. For the communist countries which have the means (and all of them have some means, however slight they may be), international duty consists in coming to the assistance of brother parties which have need of aid. For the parties which have need of aid, it also consists in making an appeal to the parties which can come to their assistance, particularly the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This appeal is certainly useful.

CP's Which Have Solidarity with the USSR

(in addition to the CP's of the socialist countries)

Europe (9): [8 listed]

**Federal Republic of Germany
Austria
West Berlin
Cyprus
Denmark
France
Luxembourg
Norway**

America (7):

**United States
Canada
Panama
Brazil
Colombia
Uruguay
Peru**

Africa (1):

Union of South Africa

Middle East (3):

**Syria
Israel
Turkey**

Far East and Pacific (6):

**India
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
Philippines
Australia**

8143

CSO: 4900

AL-SADAT INTERVIEWED ON PEACE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

TA141235 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 14 Mar 80 pp 13, 20 TA

[Interview with Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat by HA'ARETZ Cairo correspondent 'Amos Elon on 12 March at his country residence]

[Text] A thin man in a grey flannel suit, with dark features, the movement of his hands is rhythmical; President Anwar Al-Sadat in the drawing room of his country residence near the Delta Dam, about an hour's drive from Cairo. Over his head on the wall is an embossed map of the Middle East, a present from an American company to his predecessor Gamal 'Abd An-Nasir. Neither Israel's name nor its borders appear on the map--only the Arabic name Falastin.

With his back to the map the president waves his pipe: "A year has gone by since the signing of peace," he says, "and a lot has been achieved since then, a lot: the peace treaty, normalization. Who could have dreamed of this a few years ago? More than anything else we are sitting together as civilized people. We are open to each other. We are trying to solve problems. These are very major achievements. I am not overlooking them, but I am still a little disappointed, for two reasons: first because we are not making progress toward a comprehensive agreement. We have stopped half way because of Israel. The cornerstone to a comprehensive settlement is the solution to the Palestinian problem. We have made no progress on this issue. I really am very sorry about this, very much so, out of a sincere concern for our interests and yours. Even though up to now the autonomy talks have not been a total failure, no, no, not that, there has been no progress, no progress."

"For our part, we have implemented total normalization: Egyptians are traveling to Israel. Any Israeli can now come by car to Cairo. We have proved that in this sphere we are doing in 6 hours what was thought would take 6 months, but the Israelis are making difficulties. I cannot understand you. It is true that you have faithfully honored your commitments on the withdrawal and return of the oil wells, down to the last letter. It is true. But what I find missing is the main thing, and the main thing for me is the spirit; the spirit of Camp David, which you are not living by for the present. On the issue of full autonomy for the Palestinians I really am disappointed."

The president continued: "If there is no progress in the autonomy talks by 26 May a new situation will arise."

What does a new situation mean?

The president said that this would be tantamount to Israel violating the spirit of Camp David. "From the outset Egypt has made it clear that it is not seeking a separate peace."

Do you mean that there is a linkage between the pace of normalization and progress made in the autonomy talks by 26 May? And is this linkage in keeping with the spirit of the treaty?

Al-Sadat sat up and raises his voice, "Shame on you." Again the president cried out, "Shame on you. This is language of the conflict. We have finished with that style. Normalization is being implemented at this moment. It is being completed and there is no way back. We will not retract."

Still, what is the meaning of the term "a new situation will arise?"

Al-Sadat: "Don't ask me for details. I never cross a bridge before I come to it. We will think about our moves in May in view of the circumstances. Everything will be in the context of peace. The main thing is no longer to use the language of conflict and enmity. This is the biggest achievement of the past year. Let us maintain it."

The second reason for his disappointment: "The campaign that is being conducted in the United States at this time by the Jewish and Israeli lobby against the shipment of the arms to Egypt." He said that these arms are not to be aimed at Israel with whom there is peace. "Despite this the Jewish lobby is acting against us with great force. We feel this. Why all this? Does Begin fear me? I don't understand." The president pointed out: "Apparently the psychological barrier has not been lowered on your side. On our side we are now totally free of all complexes we may have had about you in the past. This can be clearly seen in my own attitude toward Israel and in the attitude of the Egyptian masses when receiving Israeli visitors in Egypt."

Despite that, don't you still find many complexes here?

"Here," the president said surprised, "where?"

For example, the boycott on the normalization declared by the doctors association, the lawyers association and the journalists association in Egypt—and these are statutory associations anchored in the law.

"This is of no significance," the president said, "this is meaningless. This is built on sand. This does not have public support. The people means 99 percent of Egypt, and they all support the peace, normalization and my policy."

How can they oppose you?

"How? They didn't ask me. Today is not like the Al-Nasir days when people who opposed the government were thrown into jail and concentration camps."

Again and again the president went back to the central issue and was not prepared to leave it: One has to make a comprehensive settlement possible by solving the Palestinian question. In the first stage through total autonomy for the Palestinians for an interim period of 5 years. And then? Does he support a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, or a Jordanian solution?

"Back in 1974, I, with King Husayn who was visiting Alexandria, urged the Palestinians to declare explicitly that there should be a strong link between the new Palestinian state, when it arises, and King Husayn. They should have explicitly declared this before the negotiations that were to have been held in Geneva." To this day this is Al-Sadat's position, and in his opinion, this is also Yasir 'Arafat's position, "the only difference between me and 'Arafat--and he has never denied this, unlike his usual denials of my remarks--is that 'Arafat wanted to make such a declaration about ties with Jordan after the establishment of a Palestinian state, while I insisted, and I still insist, that this be done in advance."

[TA141316] Therefore, Al-Sadat said, he proposed to Begin at Aswan that they agree to total autonomy in Gaza first, and at the same time appeal to King Husayn to exercise his responsibility over the West Bank, as Egypt is doing over the Gaza Strip. "Begin promised to submit this for cabinet deliberation, and I have not received an answer from him to this day."

As for Jerusalem, the president said: "My position is not so different from yours." Didn't Mr Abba Eban declare yesterday that he agrees to the raising of an Arab flag over East Jerusalem? Al-Sadat read about it this morning in the Cairo press. On Jerusalem, "We did not have an unbridgeable gap between us." How? The president said that the city should remain united and open under one joint municipality to be elected by Palestinians and Israelis. However, there can be no Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. The residents are Palestinians. Free access should be assured to all and to all places. However, "there are 800 million Muslims in the world, and this is a very delicate issue for them--just as it is for you. They will not agree to Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem."

Israel will not agree to foreign rule over the eastern part of the city.

The president shrugged his shoulders, he still repeatedly said that he is optimistic. He is a believer. Above anything else he wants to remain, as he puts it, loyal to himself. He knows that time is required. He knows that patience is required. There have to be discussions and more discussions. But we must not forget that the Palestinians are the heart of the problem. Israel and Egypt must live side by side as good neighbors.

like the Benelux countries or like the Two Germanies?

"Why talk in such extreme terms?" the president asked. "We will live as neighbors. Of course not like the two Germanies, because we are not one people like the German. Under present circumstances we can't live like the Benelux countries either. But we are able to maintain good relations as you can see now."

Joint economic and other projects?

Again the president shrugged his shoulders. Some time ago some American Jews approached him and proposed "regional cooperation." For example, they mentioned a joint nuclear power plant in Sinai and large agricultural projects. "I told them that such regional cooperation can't exist before a solution is found to the Palestinian problem." Afterwards there are many possibilities.

The president said that he is very concerned about the situation in Syria. "I know Al-Asad's character. If it is true that the Soviets are sending forces into Syria, then this commits all of us to increase our efforts to maintain the momentum of the peace process and solve the Palestinian problem. In such a case it would become a secondary problem, and we have to solve that issue with greater urgency in order to enable the other Arab countries to save themselves and join the peace process. [sentence as published] They need a face saver in order to join.

A face saver would be a solution to the Palestinian problem or progress toward such a solution. As opposed to Begin, Al-Sadat maintains that he does not fear that a Palestinian state would turn into a Soviet satellite. "The Syrians would not be able to support both Al-Asad and the Palestinians at the same time."

As for the process that began with his trip to Jerusalem, the president said that from Egypt's point of view the process, in its present state, would not have begun prior to 1973. Prior to the restoration of Egypt's self respect in that year Al-Sadat was not able to go to Jerusalem to finally break the ice. "We were totally humiliated," he said with great feeling, "it is for this reason that in 1972 I refused to respond to Kosygin's invitation to meet with Golda Meir in Tashkent."

On the other hand, according to him Israel prevented the possibility of peace following the 6 day war twice, the first time immediately after the war, had Dayan understood then the Arab psychology he would not have said: I am waiting for them to phone us. "I am surprised by him," the president said. "Dayan was born in this region. He should have known us better. He should have known that after humiliating us so we could not run and ask that conditions be dictated to us. Had you had then a noble and magnanimous leader who would have boarded a plane and come straight to Cairo--just as

I came to Jerusalem--and at the same time, as a gesture of good will, ordered a partial withdrawal, believe me that 99 percent of Egypt would have cheered him. You did not understand our psychology. This is where you went wrong. It is a good thing that we now have an opportunity of getting to know each other better."

According to him, a second opportunity of making peace was missed in 1971. Then, just after his rise to power, he announced that he was prepared to sign peace with Israel, but Golda rejected him, "You didn't have guts."

Is that so? Even as late as 1975 did he not claim that he was only prepared to sign a non-belligerence agreement? And as for diplomatic and other relations, normalization and contact between the two peoples, not before the next generation?

"That is true. In fact, even at the beginning of 1977 I claimed that peace had to be made, but we would discuss normalization in 5 years." But he changed his mind at the end of 1977. During that period, he claims, two important things happened. First, "it became clear to me that you desired to remain in a state of no war and no peace. You thought that the second disengagement agreement in Sinai would suffice. It was not enough for me. But this was not the worst discovery. Much worse than that was the situation on the Arab side." As he understood it in the summer of 1977, "it was proved that the Arabs are not inclined toward or are unable to make real peace, because of ignorance, because of an inferiority complex, because of corrupt leaders." Perhaps because they don't even have the beginning of a democracy like here, just wild tribes. "They wanted to continue with the rejection just as they are doing now. This was much harder for me and much more dangerous than your position. As soon as I understood this I made my decision."

"In the wake of the October war I was more sure of myself than I had ever been before. In 1971 I could not travel to Jerusalem because we were humiliated. I preferred then to die on my feet and not on my knees. But in the wake of the October war we were no longer humiliated. I decided that I had no other choice but to come and present a challenge to you in your Knesset. Now that we have peace I hope that many Israelis will come here and learn that we are behind it with all our hearts and with all our souls."

CSO: 4805

INTERVIEW WITH FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER ISMA'IL FAHMI

LD171427 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Mar 80 pp 8, 13 LD

[Article by former Egyptian Foreign Minister Isma'il Fahmi: "The Palestinian People's Right to Self-Determination"]

[Excerpts] Some 10 days ago I was visited by colleague and Brother Ibrahim Shukri, leader of the Socialist Labor Party, his visit was timely as it enabled us to exchange views on many important internal and external political issues of interest both to Egypt and the Arab world.

It was natural that normalization of relations with Israel should take a major part in our discussion.

In this regard I believe that a distinct line must be drawn between the procedures that have been taken so far to normalize relations in accordance with the peace treaty and the coming stage, which calls for high vigilance and great care, in the future negotiations that will lead to codifying the normalization and then imposing it on the people. Obviously, the idea is to insure the preservation of everything related to Egyptian national security and affecting vital national interests in all sectors.

However, what I say does not mean that the formal normalization of relations was a sound act, for my attitude as well as the attitude of many others to it is that it is officially impermissible and logically and popularly unacceptable. It can only be regarded as a major concession on the Egyptian negotiator's part when he basically accepted the Israeli theory of security, as stated in the treaty preamble, and the ending of the state of war before Israeli withdrawal from all the Egyptian and Arab territories, including Palestinian territories, and the reaching of a comprehensive solution with the establishment of a Palestinian state having internationally agreed borders.

I would say that what has been accomplished is impermissible and could only be seen as being the natural result of separate negotiation with Israel and the acceptance of all its terms, in the form of a series of one-sided concessions despite the continued Israeli occupation of our territories and Israel's continued denial of the right of a whole people, the Palestinian people, to live within independent and secure borders in the same manner as Israel is demanding for itself.

Therefore, the Egyptian people and the Arab nation are quite right to be shocked because of what has happened and what is being implemented now, particularly since there was a sacred political covenant between the Egyptian people and their leadership that peace must be Arab, Palestinian and comprehensive and that normalization would not take place during this generation's lifetime. This was a great national covenant which the Egyptian people and the Arab nation took very earnestly. The Egyptian people and all their institutions began preparing themselves for peace on the basis of this understanding and what it involves politically, militarily, economically and culturally.

Even more surprisingly, there is nothing in politics or in international law that makes it obligatory, when a peace treaty is signed between two warring states, for the terms of that peace to provide for normalization of relations and the exchange of ambassadors. All these are new inventions and constitute an unparalleled and major precedent.

But once the reason is known, there is no cause for surprise, as Rabin, the former Israeli prime minister, said in his memoirs, normalization has been a political and strategic goal for which Israel has planned, on the basis that it should take place while Israel retains 40 percent of Sinai for a period of 2 years. Israel deliberately insisted on this and succeeded in achieving it. But even Rabin himself, in his memoirs, is surprised at the acceptance of this condition.

The real reason for Israel's retention of 40 percent of Sinai for 2 years after the completion of the first stage of withdrawal is not related to military considerations, since up to 1967 Israel was able to launch repeated attacks even before it had Sinai. Moreover, it now has two new air bases in the Negev. The real reason is that Israel is seriously attempting to wrest Egypt from the Arab world. I believe that this is Israel's plan, from which it will not deviate in its dealing with Egypt. Through various attempts and multifaceted methods Israel will eventually create a situation leading to an Israeli blockade of Egypt, in order to keep it away from the Arab world.

Therefore, we absolutely must not naively accept what is being claimed by some people. For example, it is unacceptable to interpret this all-out openness toward Israel as a civilized action. It is painful to note that the advocates of normalization between Egypt and Israel are themselves not abiding by this concept of civilization when they deal with their own brothers in Egypt; they must first "normalize" their relations with their own brothers in Egypt.

[LD171429] What is important in my opinion is that we should not unjustifiably rush toward generously bestowing on Israel the constituents of normalization that are not even provided for in the peace treaty, unless there is a real interest in this for the broad base of the Egyptian people. For example, I find nothing in the peace treaty or its numerous supplements that obliges Egypt to offer Egyptian oil to Israel after its withdrawal from the oilfields. On the contrary, I found an American pledge in the form of an official letter

dated 26 March 1979 under which the United States undertakes to supply Israel with its oil needs after its withdrawal from Sinai for a period of 5 years, subject to renewal.

Therefore, since the official pledge for oil was given by the United States, which is a rich country and responsible for Israel, and since Egypt had no official obligation, then it is logical that the United States should honor its obligations toward Israel, and we should not volunteer to offer Israel oil extracted from Sinai--as if Israel had not even withdrawn from the oil-fields--and give oil to it at a price much lower than the price at which Egypt sells its oil in the free market. This is at a time when the Egyptian people are in need of every dollar, and oil is a strategic commodity.

Israel has exploited this oil and other natural resources free of charge. It has almost exhausted the oil deposits in the Bala'im oilfields. Moreover, Israel has not yet been asked to pay for what it has taken, and will not pay. What I fear is that Israel will pay none of the compensation it ought to pay. The losers in all this are the Egyptian people.

Over and above all this, Israel is not earnest about peace, rather the opposite. Israel, in my opinion, is exploiting what has happened to the maximum. It has not stopped taking decisions regarding the status of Jerusalem and the building of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. It is obvious that Israel has not budged an inch from its original stands. On the contrary, not only do we find it adhering to its stands held prior to Camp David but also, during and since Camp David and the signing of the peace treaty, hardening its stand regarding the occupation of territories and the Palestinian people's right to return to their home.

If we take the city of Jerusalem, for example, we observe that when the Egyptian people's assembly debated the question of this Holy City a few days ago its debate was rhetorical and did not adopt a specific decision that would be binding on the Egyptian government. I would have expected the people's assembly to adopt a specific resolution demanding that the Egyptian government ask the Israeli government to submit to its own parliament a bill rescinding the resolution which the Knesset adopted on 28 January 1967, to which all the Israeli governments have adhered since that date, including Begin's government which signed the peace treaty.

I call on the Egyptian people's assembly to issue such a specific resolution, that would be binding on the Egyptian government, calling for the suspension of all contacts with the Israeli government, including the talks on autonomy and Jerusalem, and the halting of normalization until the Knesset issues a resolution rescinding the earlier one. The reason that I am calling for the adoption of such a resolution is that the people's assembly issued several laws abolishing all the previous laws enacted as a result of the state of war between Egypt and Israel. The people's assembly took this step in the belief that the enforcement of previous laws legislated during the state of war should not continue. On the basis of the principle of equal treatment,

negotiations about Jerusalem or autonomy cannot continue with the existence of an Israeli law on territorial sovereignty. That law must be abolished if the negotiations are to have any meaning. If this does not happen, any negotiations or contacts regarding these territories will be wasted effort.

[LD171431] What happened a few days ago once again proves that these matters should not be allowed to get lost in the maze of formal meetings and ostentatious statements because, despite the peace treaty and all that the Egyptian leadership has done, Israel has not budged. On the contrary, it has escalated the question of settlements to the extent that the security council, following a Jordanian initiative, passed a new resolution on the subject. As soon as it was announced that the United States had voted for the resolution, writers competed to praise this stand. But personally I was certain that this U.S. voting for the resolution could only be a calculated step which Washington would soon disavow. What I expected happened exactly; the Israeli government must have given the U.S. president a serious warning that he could not afford to ignore in the present conditions.

I believe that we are now passing through a critical stage that makes it incumbent on us all to be frank with one another, calmly and positively. Because of the continued Israeli intransigence the situation has reached a crossroads. If that is so, then a pause is called for. There is no danger in such a pause, not even with reference to the agreement on Sinai because, as Rabin said in his memoirs, there is no legal or political link between this agreement and the autonomy framework.

It cannot be claimed that some of us are for and others against peace. That claim, in my view, is a futile evasion of reality. It is known that everybody in and outside Egypt is for lasting peace. But the difference is over what peace and whether it can be achieved in solidarity together in Egypt, despite our different stands and individual beliefs. In my opinion Egypt should not be carried away by personal emotions or verbal duels. What Egypt needs at this moment is a pause in order to digest what has been done so far. We also need a studied move toward the Arab world. I cannot imagine any reason for Egypt to isolate itself from the Arab world, even if some people want that. We should begin, now and not tomorrow, boldly but calmly building bridges with the Arab world because Egypt, by virtue of its fate and destiny, has no political weight unless it has substantial influence in the Arab world and is influenced by it. I would like here to restate a proposal which I have advanced before and which a foreign journalists reported about 6 month ago. This is that Egypt, in its negotiations with Israel, submit a specific proposal calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state, whose neutrality is recognized internationally and guaranteed by all the major powers. In other words, a neutral Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories as defined by the UN partition resolution. The United States and Britain are considering a similar proposal for Afghanistan.

EGYPT

NEW PROPAGANDA OFFICES TO BE ESTABLISHED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Jan 80 p 6

[Article by Mustafa al-Damrani: "New Map for Egyptian Information Covers Entire World"]

[Text] In light of the political and international changes and the events now occurring, and with the coming of the post-settlement phase, Egypt has begun to reexamine the geographical distribution of its information offices abroad, and draw a new map for our foreign information policy. The purpose of this move is to clarify Egypt's position on various international issues, and stress Egypt's role in the achievement of peace based on justice.

On February 1, Egypt will begin implementing a new information policy by means of our new information offices. Through this policy, the information offices will become the first line of defense against opposing claims and propaganda, and a tool with which to interact with modern information media, present the best and most favorable image possible before public opinion in each country concerned, and convey to the headquarters in Cairo a true picture of information conditions, trends and public opinion within the state to which a given office is delegated.

According to Safwat al-Sharif, chief of the Information Agency, the new information plan provides for particular attention to be devoted to the Islamic states in general and to those states which have large Islamic concentrations. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that most of these states are developing states like Egypt. Consequently, they have experienced, and are now experiencing, the same political, social and economic hardships as Egypt, and are going through the same problems of development and construction. For this reason, we find that addressing public opinion in these states based on a method of mutual identification is profitable and effective. In fact, it can be very effective in winning public opinion and creating open minds within political and information circles in these states. Moreover, some of the African and Islamic states carry great weight and strategic importance for Egypt because of their geographic positions, in addition to the fact that the bloc of African, Asian, Islamic and Arab states represents almost half the member states in the United Nations, a situation which is

very advantageous when votes are taken in the various UN committees. In addition, the efforts of Egypt's peace policy have left impressions on the international community as a result of information-related tours, visits, interviews and meetings of President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, Vice President Husni Mubarak and the other officials. This has helped to strengthen the Egyptian image in the minds of many people in the various states. In spite of this, however, we are in need of additional information efforts so that the official and popular organizations in the various states will gain an understanding of Egypt's desire for peace and development.

Goals of the Information Move

The information move in its new form is aimed at achieving several objectives. The most important of these is to counter hostile information. Activities are in the works to counter such hostile information in a calm, scientific and studied manner; to create an information climate which is favorable to Egyptian interests abroad; to focus attention on Egypt's efforts to deepen political democracy which has made radical changes in Egyptian society; to emphasize Egypt's longing for peace and stability and its efforts directed at economic and social development; and to explain the economic open door policy which Egypt is pursuing and the incentives it can offer to the foreign investor.

Transformation of Washington Office Into Big Information Center

Safwat al-Sharif adds: "According to the new information plan which begins in 1980, it has been decided to expand the Washington information office into a big information center and link it with the information offices in New York and Ottawa, Canada, in order to serve the entire area and clarify Egypt's image and its position for all the peoples in these areas. This will be done through telex equipment and by opening local telephone lines, linked directly to the Washington center, in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago and Atlanta in order to cover the West, Midwest, Southwest and Southeast and apprise information media, universities, institutes, schools and religious centers of Egypt's position and its activities on behalf of peace and development. The Washington center will be augmented with four information attaches. The first will be assigned to local activity. The second will be concerned with contacting Egyptian and Arab students and envoys and monitoring local newspaper and broadcasting activity in New York, the central and western areas of the United States and California. The third attache will be in charge of monitoring and analyzing American and Jewish public opinion. The job of the fourth attache will be to keep a record of the center's activity throughout the continent."

Centers in Bonn and Paris

Also included in the plan is the establishment of two new information centers. The first will be located in Bonn and will provide information coordination for the Scandinavian states and Holland in view of the proximity of West

Germany to these states. This proximity will facilitate communication with these states and contribute to freedom of movement in the area if information-related circumstances make this necessary, aside from the fact that the German language is the basis of the languages of the states in this area. The second information office will be located in Paris in order to provide information coordination for the offices in Brussels, Belgium, and Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, this office will provide human and material support to the information offices in London, Paris and Bonn in view of the political and economic importance of these capitals and the fact that their broadcasts penetrate the neighboring European states and the Arab states, making them unusually formidable and effective information centers for extensive sectors in Europe and the Arab states.

New Office in Austria

It has also been decided to open a new information office in Austria in view of the important new role emerging in world politics as a result of the enormous efforts Austrian officials have made to take part in solving the Middle East problem and strengthening the cause of peace in the area. This is based on [Austria's] recognition of Egypt's historic position, of the pioneering role played by the Egyptian leadership in the peace process, and of Egypt's desire to spotlight the importance of the special and growing relationship between Egypt and Austria, the dynamic importance of Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky, his influence on international socialism, and the potential effect of this on other European socialist parties.

Tokyo and Resolution 242

According to Safwat al-Sharif, the plan devotes special attention to Tokyo by opening a large information office there which will begin to carry out its steadily increasing activity this year. The reasons for this move are Japan's importance on the international battleground as an economic and industrial giant, its international political weight, its support for Resolution 242 of November 1967, and the necessity that it be won over to the Egyptian policy. Additional reasons for special emphasis on Japan are its good relationship with Egypt and President al-Sadat's anticipated visit to the country signaling the beginning of a new era of active relations between the two countries.

The information plan does not ignore Ankara on its new map, but gives it special attention in view of Turkey's unique geographical position and the fact that it is a hot area. Another factor is Turkey's importance as concealed in the traditional struggle of whether to remain tied to Europe and the West in general, which is the prevailing situation at this time, or to rejoin the Middle East region and the Islamic world. In view of this, it was essential that a new information office be established in Turkey to perform its mission in the area.

Australia and the Peace Campaign

The plan notes that an information presence is now a necessity in Australia, because Australia has clearly begun to devote a greater share of its attention in foreign policy to its relationship with the Middle East region and the Arab world. Australia is endeavoring to reevaluate its foreign policy vis-a-vis the region. The Egyptian peace campaign has influenced a number of politicians in Australia, or at least induced them to reconsider their traditional idea about the Middle Eastern nations and Egypt in particular. This situation can be exploited and turned to advantage.

As Romania's interest in the Middle East problem, along with its interest in the cause of peace in the region is increasing, the establishment of an information office in Bucharest during a subsequent phase is a necessity for several reasons, as brought out in the plan. Among the most important of these are the special relations which began between the presidents of the two states, the efforts of these leaders to establish peace in the region, and Romania's success in freeing itself to a considerable extent from Soviet control in formulating its foreign policy. Another reason is the fact that nearly 350,000 Jews have emigrated from Romania to Israel, causing Romania itself to increase its interest in Arab-Israeli relations and [to consider as appropriate] the opening of an Egyptian information office there. This will lend this office flexibility and an ability to reach the information media, the leaders, and public opinion in Romania.

The Information Presence in Addis Ababa

Despite the hostile position which the Marxist regime in Ethiopia has taken toward Egypt, the information plan attaches special importance to the need to maintain an Egyptian information presence in Addis Ababa, in view of Ethiopia's important and strategic position and the security problems of the Red Sea, as well as the fact that the headquarters of the OAU is located in Addis Ababa. Consequently, the presence of an Egyptian information office there can work to open channels, if only to some extent, with Ethiopian personalities. The office will also be in a position to concentrate part of its activities inside the OAU, even if its role is limited to making inroads and opening channels from within the OAU.

Strengthening the Information Presence in the Arab States

The plan makes it clear that action to strengthen and maintain the Egyptian information presence in the Arab states is certainly necessary, especially at this important time in the progress of the cause of peace in the region. In fact, constant consideration must be given to strengthening the Egyptian information presence and endeavoring to open new offices in any of the Arab states when the Arab climate is appropriate.

25 Information Counselors and Attaches

Some 25 experts in the information fields in Egypt have been selected to carry out the plan. Substantial work experience and specialization in the information field were requirements for selection. The experts include six counselors: 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman Rahmi, who has been attached to Egypt's permanent delegation to the United Nations in New York, Ms Buthaynah Wahbah (Canberra), Ms Samirah Amin (Ankara), Ms Zaynab Mustafa (Belgrade), Jalal al-Rashidi (Washington) and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Katib (Kuwait).

Muhammad Shafiq al-Barr, our information attache in Nairobi, explains the information man's mission in the new phase, especially now that peace has been achieved. He says: "Our mission must be centered around clarifying Egypt's cultural position on various international issues and controversies-- a position which has been clear ever since President al-Sadat took office. Our mission is also to explain that Egypt is constantly striving to achieve peace based on justice among the different peoples of the world, and is constantly working so that peace may take the place of war and destruction and love may take the place of hatred and malice in the hearts of men. We must also clarify our position regarding liberation and independence movements and Egypt's clear struggle to find a solution for the Palestinian problem which is practical and free from demagoguery."

Jalal al-Rashidi, our information counselor in Washington, also has an idea of the information man's mission. He feels it is necessary to carry the voice of Egypt to every individual in the region in which he works and to inform the people about the progress which Egypt has achieved in various fields of knowledge during the era of peace. Ahmad Yusri 'Abd-al-Karim, our information attache in Romania, attaches importance to the signs of progress, building, and the phase of prosperity that Egypt will soon experience, which is the post-peace settlement phase.

'Izz-al-Din Shawkat, who will carry out his information mission at our information center in Washington, concentrates on addressing the post-Viet Nam and post-Watergate generation, and acquainting it with Egypt's efforts on behalf of a total and lasting peace for the Arab region now that the image of the Egyptian man has been established in the minds of the American man. He also concentrates on informing people of Egypt's role in civilization and culture over a period of centuries, and of Egypt's geographical position as the connecting link between Eastern and Western cultures, while maintaining its own identity and heritage.

8591

CSO: 4802

ARMED FORCES PENSIONS AND BENEFITS INCREASED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Jan 80 p 8

[Article by Ahmad Husayn: "Ten Percent Increase for Armed Forces Pensioners"]

[Text] A bill has been prepared to give a 10 percent increase for armed forces pensioners and beneficiaries of entitled persons in order to equalize their pensions with those of civilian pensioners. The bill will also grant a pension in the amount of 50 percent of the last wage level, but not less than the minimum military pension, for those whose period of service ended prior to 1960 and who were not entitled to a pension. In the event of death, this pension will be paid to the beneficiaries, who will be exempted from refunding the stipend already paid.

With regard to entitled persons or pensioners who are now making payments (for past periods) for life or for periods exceeding 15 years, the bill stipulates that installments will cease to be collected from them after 15 years, without this affecting [their pensions or entitlements]. The bill simplifies a number of procedures and includes the following rules:

1. Increase in pensions: Pensions due to pensioners and beneficiaries of entitled persons in accordance with the provisions of pensions laws enacted prior to 21 March 1974 will be increased by 10 percent, excluding those cases which have been readjusted and those cases in which pensions have been raised for exceptional reasons, unless the 10 percent increase is more favorable. In all cases, the increase in pensions shall not result in any change in the established cost-of-living allowance.

Pensions payable to those who completed their service prior to 1 October 1975 and their beneficiaries will be increased by 10 percent, but not less than 2 pounds per month and not more than 8 pounds per month. This is being done in an effort to bring the pensions of these individuals closer to the pensions of those who completed their service after the aforementioned date.

2. Readjustment of Pensions: If the pension of the entitled individual or his beneficiary is less than 50 pounds per month, and the period of service of the entitled individual was more than 28.8 years, the pension will

be adjusted based entirely on the individual's pay level and period of service up to a maximum of 36 years, provided that the pension shall not exceed 50 pounds per month. If the entitled individual's period of service exceeds 36 years, he will be paid the extra service stipend, and he is allowed to request adjustment of his pension on the basis of his pay level and period of service to a maximum of 80 percent of the last pay level to which he was entitled. A stipend will be paid based on the period of extra service beyond 28.8 years. In this case, an extraordinary pension for the individual or his beneficiaries is not permitted.

3. Unlawfulness of Sequestration of Pensions: It is unlawful to sequester or waive the entitlements of the entitled individual, the pensioner or the beneficiaries, except to recover amounts paid to them in error, amounts [in lieu of delinquent contributions] or to defray expenses related thereto, amounts due on loans from the Nasir Social Bank or the Officers' Loan Association or amounts due to the State Economic Company of the Armed Forces.

4. Social Benefits: The bill stipulates that certain social benefits will be granted to pensioners. These include a reduction of at least 50 percent in the tariffs on communications, railroads and public means of transportation; a 50-percent reduction in the prices of admission to clubs, museums, exhibitions, theaters and movie houses; and a 50-percent reduction in the costs of the pilgrimage to Mecca, the 'umrah [less formal pilgrimage at any time of the year] and trips organized by the government, the state authorities or the public sector inside or outside Egypt. The bill provides for enjoyment by pensioners and entitled beneficiaries of any other benefits stipulated by the social security law; and extension of these benefits to members of the Association of War Veterans, or men disabled in war operations or as a result of military service. The bill also provides for an allowance of 2 percent of the pension for total disability, if the pensioner's condition requires that someone assist him with the chores of his daily life, provided that the payment of this allowance shall cease if the pensioner accepts a job, no longer requires such assistance, or dies.

5. Coast Guard and Border Patrol Personnel: The pensions of beneficiaries of military personnel of the coast, border, port and lighthouse services who were martyred since 1 January 1948 will be readjusted to equal the pensions of their counterparts of the same rank or grade in the main armed forces. The State Authority for Insurance and Pensions will be responsible for adjusting and paying the pensions due, since it performed these functions at the termination of their service.

8591
CSO: 4802

SHORTAGE OF UNIVERSITY TEXTBOOKS DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 18 Feb 80 p 7

[Article by Yusuf 'Izz-al-Din, Faridah 'Abbas, Sumayyah Ahmad, et al: "The University Textbook is in Short Supply!"]

[Text] As usual, the university textbook problem has grown worse as the countdown to the examination period begins.

The problem is a familiar one, beginning anew every university year, but opinions differ as to how to portray it.

Most professors assert that the university is not a school but an institution of a scholarly nature with respect to the investigation, study and pursuit of sources without reliance on textbooks.

The students reply: "But the textbook has first place in the universities. It is more necessary for the university student than the school textbook is for the school student."

They offer many reasons: the crowded lecture halls, the lectures which can only be heard over loudspeakers out of sight of the professor, and the poor university libraries!

There is also a third party: the Central Organization for University and School Textbooks and Educational Aids, which has borne the main burden of confronting this problem since its establishment in 1975.

It is only fair to say that this organization, which is headed by former Minister of Education 'Ali 'Abd-al-Raziq, is sparing no effort, commensurate with its resources, to provide the texts required for the university.

The figures show that the organization printed 24 books during academic year 1975-76, 117 textbooks during 1977-78 and 178 textbooks this year.

During April and May of this year, an integrated book production line with a capacity of 5,000 copies per hour will be installed as one of the

organization's projects to enable it to print any number of university textbooks in the fastest possible time and at the lowest cost.

Scarce Texts

Nevertheless, the picture within the colleges points to shortages of a number of texts.

For example, at the University of Cairo:

1. College of Medicine: Books which failed to arrive were the anatomy text book's volume pertaining to the head and neck, the volume of the book "Waza'if al-A'da'" [Physiology] pertaining to the central nervous system; "Al-Tibb al-Nafsi" [Psychology] for second-year students; "Al-Fisiyoloji" [Physiology]' "Al-Sadr wa al-Batn" [The Chest and Abdomen]; "Al-Niyurotonomy" [Neuroanatomy] for first-year students; "Halat fi al-Tufayliat" [Cases of Parasites]; "Al-Tariqah al-Ikhtibariyah fi al-Baktiriya" [The Experimental Method With Bacteria] for third-year students; and "al-Nisa'" [Women] for fourth-year students.
2. Dentistry: Books not received were "Muqaddimat al-Tashrih al-Insani" [Introduction to Human Anatomy]; "Kawn wa al-Tijan wa al-Jusur" [Crowns and Bridges] for second-year students; "Al-Jirahah al-'Ammah wa al-Tibb" [General Surgery and Medicine] for third-year students; and the books "Amrad al-Liththah" [Diseases of the Gums] and "Jirahah al-Fan" [Oral Surgery] for fourth-year students.
3. College of Information: Books not received were "Al-I'lan" [Advertising] and "Iqtisadiyat al-Watan al-'Arabi" [Economies of the Arab Homeland] for second-year students; "Idarah Mu'assasat Suhufiyah" [Management of Press Organizations], "Al-Tahrir al-Suhufi" [Newspaper Editing] and "Tarikh al-Sihafah" [History of Journalism] for the third year of journalism; "Al-'Alaqa al-'Ammah" [Public Relations] and "Al-I'lan" [Advertising] for the third year of public relation; and "Al-'Alaqa al-'Ammah" [Public Relations] and "Al-I'lan" [Advertising] for the fourth year of public relations.
4. College of Economics and Political Science: Texts not received were the Italian text, the mathematics text, "Al-Tarikh al-Iqtisadi li Masr" [Economic History of Egypt], and "Al-'Ulam al-Sulukiyah" [Behavioural Sciences] for first-year students; the treatise "'Alaqa Siyasiyah" [Political Relations] for the second-year of economics; and the treatises "Al-Hukumat al-Muqaranah" [Comparative Governments], "Al-Maliyah al-'Ammah" [Public Finance] and "Tanzim al-Qada' al-Duwal" [Organization of International Law] for the third year of political science.
5. College of Law: Books not received were "Al-Qanun al-Idari" [Administrative Law] and "Al-Qanun al-Madani" [Civil Law] for second-year students; and "Al-Injlizi" [English] and the second volume of "Al-'Uqubat" [Punishments] for third-year students.

6. College of Business: Books not received were "Muhasabah al-Takalif" [Cost Accountin], "Maddah Hukumiyah" [Government and Business] and "Al-Ihsa'" [Statistics] for third-year students.

7. College of Engineering: Books not received were "Al-Kahraba'iyah al'Dinamikiyah" [Dynamic Electricity] and "Al-Fiziya' al-'Amali" [Applied Physics] for the preparatory year.

What Do the Professors Say?

Now, what do the university professors say about the textbook problem?

"I reject the word 'textbook,' because the university relies on scholarly research." These are the words of Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Hasaballah representative of the Qaer al-'Ayni Medical College. He adds: "The university student is not limited to one book, because the things he is studying are found in numerous reference sources which he consults in the library."

This view is supported by Dr Shawqi 'Atallah, a representative of Cairo Business College, who says: "The student enters the university with the mentality of a secondary student, and his whole concern during the first year is to look for books and treatises."

On the other hand, Dr Mukhtar al-Tuhami, a representative of the College of Information, recommends that the libraries be developed and supplied with scholarly reference sources, and that library hours with the professors and meetings with tutors be arranged.

He attributes the delay in the receipt of some books and treatises to "congestion at the printing presses," the emigration of technical workers and the rising cost of paper.

He calls for coordinating the efforts of the university as a whole to print the books and papers that the students need, even if it means establishing a university-owned publishing house to help make scholarly reference sources available.

Crisis of Confidence

Dr Sayyid Khayrallah, dean of the College of Education at al-Mansurah, feels that the idea of the textbook cannot be dismissed, because it is an existing reality experienced by all Egyptian universities.

He attributes the problem of university texts to a crisis of confidence between the members of the faculties and the central organizations which are working to solve the problem, such as the Central Organization for School and University Textbooks.

Printing of Texts During Vacation

Dr Abu al-Wafa al-Taftazani, dean of the College of Education at al-Fayyum, lists the difficulties concerning university texts. These include high printing costs at the privately owned printing presses utilized by most professors and the impossibility of printing texts at the beginning of the academic year due to congestion at the presses.

He proposes that books be printed by the Central Organization for University Textbooks, with a guarantee that authors be furnished sufficient remuneration.

Each University Should Print its Own Requirements

Dr Lutfi al-Sayyid, vice president of Halwan University, describes the textbook problem as "an eternal crisis even when paper was abundant and cheap, because each professor values his own effort and consequently raises his prices.

"The ideal solution is for each university to assume responsibility for printing its own requirements and books for all the colleges, with the provision that it be supported by the state or that academic curricula be standardized."

Dictation Method is Wrong

Dr Barri 'Abd-al-Ghani Sabrah, a professor in the Chemistry Department at al-Fayyum College of Education, calls for subsidies for paper used in printing textbooks for both university and private printing presses. He says that he does not endorse the dictation method which some professors use, because it wastes half the time.

Notes Are an Alternative

Dr Sa'id 'Abe-al-'Aziz Mazin, a professor at Zagazig College of Sciences, says: "The professor also faces the problem of the rising cost of books in relation to his salary and reference sources which are unavailable to him or the student."

He proposes making notes as an alternative because they cost less.

Cooperative Associations for Professors

Dr Faruq 'Ali Isma'il, a professor at the al-Fayyum College of Education, says: "The textbook problem can only be dealt with through spontaneous solutions. We cannot rely on the Central Organization for University Textbooks because its resources have so far been limited and large numbers of books must be printed. The regional universities, on the other hand, have limited numbers of students, and thus we rely on private printing presses in the governorate.

Terms Impose a Greater Hardship

Dr Samir Ahmad Sayf al-Yazal, assistant professor at al-Fayyum Agricultural College, calls attention to the seriousness of the textbook problem for an institution such as al-Fayyum Agricultural College, where a term system is followed in which the length of the term is limited to 12 weeks while books reach the students over 3 months late. As a result, the students take examinations without textbooks.

"For this reason, the professors prefer a system based on notes, because it is faster and allows for new scientific changes each year as opposed to textbooks which require time and effort to change.

"I propose that the libraries be strengthened at every college, and that a law be established requiring each professor to contribute 10 copies of his book or notes to the library. I also recommend that student associations participate in the printing of texts.

A University Without a Printing Office or Library

'Ali 'Ali 'Abd-al-Tawwab, an assistant in the Education and Psychology Department at al-Fayyum College of Education, says: "The regional universities suffer from the same problem as the parent universities in Cairo, because of the lack of libraries or printing offices. Thus, the professors turn to the presses in the private sector, and the student is faced with rising textbook prices or delayed textbooks."

Printing Offices at the Regional Universities

Dr Asamah Muhammad Zaki, a lecturer at the business colleges in Bani Suwayf and Cairo, recommends that printing offices be established at the regional universities, and that the printing capacity of the Central Organization for Textbooks be increased.

Dr Muhyi al-Azhari, a professor at Bani Suwayf Business College, asserts that it is impossible to solve the problem except by expanding printing resources and making subsidized paper available.

"The professor cannot have his book printed before studying or during the summer vacation, because he does not know what he will teach to the next group. This is determined by meeting with the students, learning about scientific changes abroad and taking into account the level of the students."

Recording of Lectures

Dr Muhammad Fathi al-Shaniti, vice president of Zagazig University, proposes that each college record the lectures delivered by the professors and then print and distribute them at cost.

Zagazig University has signed a contract for the establishment of a printing office at a cost of 750,000 pounds, and work has begun to get it ready for operation next year.

[The Students Are to Blame]

Dr Jamal Zakariyya, dean of 'Ayn Shams College of Arts asserts: "The mere discussion of textbooks is unacceptable, because the meaning of the university is research and study and the formation of a learned individual. In the college of sciences, the laboratory is the foundation. In medicine, the operating room is the foundation. And in the arts, the library plays the part of the laboratory and the operating room."

Student Association Participates

Dr Muhammad al-Shibrawi 'Ali, representative of the al-Mansurah Medical College, asserts: "The rising prices of reference sources can be overcome through spontaneous efforts. The Association of Students of al-Mansurah Medical College, for example, supervises the printing of professors' notes starting in the summer and these notes are distributed to the students at cost. A special library called the Student Library has been established, and the students collect contributions from the professors in their college."

Sheet of Paper Is 180 Milliemes [as published]

Dr Ahmad al-Baz, dean of the al-Mansurah College of Sciences, interprets the university textbook problem as a tragedy in terms of its cost and the time of its occurrence. He says that he has formed a committee at the college called the "Printed Materials Committee" which is setting the prices of the professors' books so that the cost of a sheet of paper does not exceed 18 milliemes.

Dr Yusri 'Abd-al-Raziq al-Jawhari, dean of the College of Arts at al-Minya University, stresses the necessity of making paper available at moderate prices and lowering the price of printing while raising the living standard of individuals.

Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Naghi, dean of the College of Sciences at al-Minya University, calls for the universities to resort to joint authoring of textbooks through some specific organization, such as a specialized Committee of the Higher Council of Universities, and the reprinting of foreign textbooks in moderately priced editions.

Dr Yahya Shahin, president of al-Minya University, says that the university has purchased a press, and that contacts will be made with the faculties in order to print notes and sell them at cost beginning next year.

What the Students Say

Now we let the students portray the size of the problem for us:

Hatim Zamzam at 'Ayn Shams, Law College: "The delay in the publication of books causes some students not to attend the examinations and also leads to cheating."

Mukhtar Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hadi, College of Sciences: "Reliance on textbooks is inevitable in spite of the problems with them."

Al-Hasan 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Sayyid, College of Engineering: "The procedure of photocopying reference sources is very costly."

Sharif Salim Ahmad, College of Arts: "Some courses have no textbooks at all."

Nifal Husayn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, al-Mansurah College of Law: "Eighty percent of the failures are due to the delay of books and the difficulty of the courses."

Muhammad Muhammad Yunis, al-Mansurah College of Sciences: "Notes are badly printed and expensive."

Muhammad Diya'-al-Din, al-Mansurah College of Business: "Some professors force us to buy their new books at high prices just by adding a few pages to the course."

Najih Muhammad Abu Khadr, Tanta College of Sciences: "We buy the books and lay them aside, because we don't find time to study them!"

Muhammad Taha al-Najjar, al-Mansurah College of Medicine: "We spend more than 80 pounds a year on books alone."

These Solutions

If these are the problems, what do the students propose in the way of solutions?

'Ali 'Aql, president of the association of Halwan University: "The university must intervene and establish the price of a textbook on the basis of the number of pages, and a printing office must be established for each college."

This proposal is supported by Hisham al-Mahdi, president of the association of the College of Fine Arts, Isma'il Muhammad Khalil and Abu-Bakr Husayn at the al-Fayyum College of Education, and Mahmud Ahmad Hasan at the Bani Suwayf College of Business, who also proposes that textbook paper be subsidized.

Muhammad Mahmud al-Qamini, Bani Suwayf College of Business: "Books must be submitted to the presses before the beginning of the academic year."

Fayiz 'Abdallah, al-Fayyum College of Agriculture: "The textbook can be dispensed with and the students can rely on recording the main points during the lectures."

Mahmud Zakariyya Kamil, president of the association at al-Minya University: He proposes that the Board of the Humanities, Arts and Culture take part in the printing and distribution of books at moderate prices.

'Issam Muhammad Hafiz, secretary of the Student Activities Coordination Council at Cairo University, proposes that the councils of student associations at the colleges take charge of the printing and distribution of books.

'Umar Tawfiq 'Uwaydah, secretary of the association council at the College of Economics and Political Science, proposes that each college photocopy reference sources available in the libraries and distribute copies to the students.

8591

CSO: 4802

ISLAMIC LAND REFORM ALREADY BEING REALIZED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Jan 80 p 9

[Interview with Professor Reza Esfahani, deputy minister of agriculture, by KEYHAN--date and place not given]

[Text] Islamic land reform has already been accomplished in many areas of the country. This matter was discussed in a special KEYHAN interview with Professor Reza Esfahani, deputy minister of agriculture.

Professor Esfahani stated that Islamic land reform, which is swiftly being carried out and that in many districts has already been established, should not be interpreted to mean that our work and responsibility toward the farmers have cause to end. Rather the provision of loans for seed, tractors and other farm necessities is being carried out, more or less successfully. But the fact not to be ignored is that land reform is being planned only in conformance with Islamic standards and the views of those persons who are well-informed in Islamic issues. He added that in a country so large and so disjointed one should not expect that all the wishes of all the people could come true in a short period of time. The feudalists and their supporters have unleashed certain tunes in some of their own newspapers saying that land reform is a riot-provoking issue, with no results. The best answer to them is to tell them to come and see the work with that which was accomplished during the Pahlavi's reign and after the revolution during the tenure of the previous authorities of the Ministry of Agriculture.

He added that it is being said that many areas have not been planted. One must say that this is a pure lie, because in many areas the ceded lands have been planted, and some people were compelled to plant out of fear lest their lands should be confiscated.

But in connection with areas not planted yet, it must be noted that the history of these lands dates back to the period preceding the events and victory of the Islamic Revolution. Contrary to the farmers' expectations, they did not obtain what they needed. The government was more obedient to and complied with the wishes of the feudalists so that the big landowners

and feudalists behaved spitefully toward the farmers pursuing their own rights. The feudalists neither planted the land themselves nor put it at the disposal of the farmers for cultivation. The government, in its turn, supported the feudalists. During this period they didn't cede any land to the farmers to plant nor did they allow tenant-farming as they had previously done. If it is said that last year a great number of farmers were engaged in cultivation, it was due to the Imam's order and not because of the miraculous efforts of the agricultural officials, despite the fact that in their reports they ascribed the increase in cultivation to their efforts, and considered it as a credit.

It must also be mentioned that Islamic land reform must be carried out by the government, and not by organs having no responsibility. This reform must gather inspiration from the laws of Islam, far from any inclinations and tendencies, and no non-Islamic ideology should attribute it to itself. Esfahani ended his statements by requesting "our farmer brothers to cultivate their lands as much as possible, so that our produce approach the self-sufficient level."

9597

CSO: 4906

FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON FRONT OF OPPRESSED ADVOCATED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Feb 80 p 5

[Text] In continuing our reports on the views of candidates for the first revolutionary assembly and their views on the basic formation of the assembly we give you the ideas of two more candidates.

Dr Mohhamed Ali Hadi is a candidate of the Islamic Republic Party, the Islamic Revolutionary Militants Society, the group of militant spiritual people and the office of the peoples cooperation with the president. He said regarding his own candidacy, "The Iranian revolution, which is the greatest modern revolution in form and substance, resembling those of the prophets, has the most important mission of responsibility toward Muslims and the oppressed of the world. The mission of our revolution operates on both the domestic and foreign fronts and candidates must heed this. On the domestic front I will try, with the assistance and cooperation of other assembly delegates, to bring into being a complete system of Islamic government and to remove as quickly as possible all the problems left from the previous regime and create something superior. At this time there must be complete unity and cooperation between the assembly and government officials to form a united front. Without this the assembly will accomplish nothing. To bring about this unity steps must be taken to purge government offices and ministries of those attached to the traitorous former regimes. For the unemployed, new steps must be taken and a strong system of administration created from the revolutionary people so that it can execute the wishes of the assembly as quickly and completely as possible. Similarly, purification should be looked at as a very important historical principle and must be taken more seriously than at present. Of course, it is not only purification but the whole system of bureaucracy which we have inherited from the former regime and made up of our enemies who hinder the plans of the revolution which must be removed. On the foreign front I will try as soon as possible to destroy the walls which the East and the West have built around our revolution to isolate it and make Iran the base of revolution in the family of nations. All our foreign policy must act and be in correspondence with the greatness of our Islamic revolution. To do this our principal programs should be:

- "1. A widespread and inclusive detailed purification of the ministries;
- "2. Removing the bureaucracy which exists in government organizations in order to stimulate the operational machine;
- "3. Bringing about complete Islamic discipline in politics, economics, the military and education which will be a model for all muslims;
- "4. Saving Iran from all foreign attachments and creating complete self-sufficiency in all fields and establishing a new foreign policy in keeping with the greatness of the revolution which can move to form a united front of the oppressed."

9448

CSO: 4906

ARMED FORCES PURGE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

Army Purge

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 10 Feb 80 p 1

[Text] -- Tabriz -- The AZADEGAN correspondent reports that the Minister of Defense, who had come to Tabriz to participate in the Revolution's anniversary celebrations, announced that 7500 of the Army's personnel have been purged, that this purge is still going on, and that, each day, files of a large number of personnel are being reviewed by a five-man commission. Dr Chamran, who was discussing the problems in Kurdistan and in the Army on television, responded to the questions of several people who were participating in a round-table discussion with him. The Minister of Defense said regarding the Army purge, "During the past two months, 7500 of the Army's personnel have been purged based on various criteria, and this figure pertains only to the Ground Forces. The files of 500 to 700 additional people are being reviewed each week, and they are being purged in order that, gradually, we might transform the Army into a Revolutionary, Islamic Army."

He added, "I am not satisfied with the Army. We expect a great deal from the Army considering the funds being spent on it. Although, were it not for this very Army, our enemies would have cut us to pieces, because the Revolutionary Guards do not have the necessary expertise in large-scale clashes. Moreover, the Army has proven itself in Kurdistan." He stressed that the purge is still going on and that the five-man commission is reviewing files and approving those to be purged. Dr Chamran said, "The Army needs profound and fundamental change, but the clashes that occurred did not permit us to take action in this direction."

The Minister of Defense said, "The present Army does not fit in with the plans and ideas that I have for the future. I think that the experts, technicians, and tacticians should remain among the personnel and that the Army's soldiers should be the people themselves." Dr Chamran was asked, "Why did you arm the feudalists in Kurdistan?" He answered, "I did not have any weapons with which I might arm the feudalists; however, 250 members of the Mangun Tribe were armed by the Gendarmerie for defense of the bases along the border with Iraq, and they were receiving 1500 toman per month. These people also disarmed the Democratic Party personnel by making use of the tanks they obtained from the Mahabad Garrison."

Air Force Purge

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Feb 80 p 3

[Text] By decree of the religious judge, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, 145 of the commanders, officers, and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Air Force have been removed from service and have been prohibited from leaving the country.

Ayatollah Khalkhali's decree, which removes 145 people from service, states:

"Since, based upon sufficient proof and evidence, the aforementioned personnel have been declared counter-revolutionaries who have carried on counter-revolutionary activities in the Air Force and other ranks of the Armed Forces, they are hereby expelled from the Islamic Republic of Iran's Air Force and are prohibited from leaving the country until the files on their misconduct have been investigated.

"Signed and Sealed by,

"Sadeq Khalkhali

"Religious Judge

"17 Bahman 1358 [6 February 1980]"

In an interview with KEYHAN last night, Ayatollah Khalkhali announced that an order for the expulsion of 145 of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Air Force personnel was issued yesterday afternoon, and he said, "After reviewing the files of 145 revolutionaries who had engaged in conspiring against the independence and territorial integrity of Iran at home and abroad, both before and after the revolution, and after studying the existing proofs and abundant evidence, it became clear to us that permitting this group to remain in the ranks of the Armed Forces was contrary to the best interests of the country and the people. I might add that there were factions which would not even consider retiring these people, much less expel them. When this assignment was turned over to me, I decided that one could not pay them exorbitant retirement benefits considering the ever-growing poverty of this nation. I therefore issued the decree for their expulsion, and those people in the Armed Forces who try to protect this group will be strictly prosecuted."

Ayatollah Khalkhali added, "All of these individuals are prohibited from leaving the country, and, if instances of misconduct and crime are found in their files and are supported by evidence, they must be prosecuted. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran is charged with cooperating with the police and the Armed Forces in the airport and on the borders to prevent these individuals from leaving the country."

Ayatollah Khalkhali continued, "Unfortunately, these purges should have been carried out as early as possible by the previous government; but, as we saw,

the previous government did not conduct a decisive purge of all of the government departments and organizations throughout the country, and this promoted the growth of counter-revolution. I might add that the recent purge was requested by the majority of the Air Force personnel, who are faithful to the Revolution, and this purge was achieved through their diligent persistence."

Ayatollah Khalkhali also said, "The sabotage in Dakal Shah Nakhjir (located in the Ilam area), which inflicted extensive damage, might be attributable to these same expelled elements whose ideas, unfortunately, have been heeded by junior NCOs."

In conclusion, Ayatollah Khalkhali said, "I would like to extend my sincere thanks to His Excellency Major General Shadmehr, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and other individuals on the Armed Forces Staff who placed the necessary resources at my disposal."

The names of the commanders, officers, and NCOs expelled from the Islamic Republic of Iran's Air Force and also prohibited from leaving the country are as follows:

1. Lieutenant General Pereidun Sanjar
2. Brigadier General Parviz Aminiyan
3. Brigadier General Mohammed Saveji
4. Brigadier General Afshar Tus
5. Colonel Mohammad Khatemi
6. Brigadier General Asadollah Baqa'i
7. Brigadier General Afshar
8. Major General Minu Sepehr
9. Brigadier General Ja'far Marandi
10. Major General Firuzmand
11. Brigadier General Abolqasem Parviz
12. Brigadier General Salkhaniyan
13. Brigadier General Changizi
14. Brigadier General Ghafari
15. Brigadier General Afsahi

16. Brigadier General Rahim Farmanesh
17. Brigadier General Hoseyn Azadegan
18. Brigadier General Mehdi Rokni
19. Major General Rahmatollah Moshirfar
20. Major General Daftari
21. Brigadier General Ash'ari
22. Pilot Colonel Daryush Jalali
23. Lieutenant General Sa'id Mehdivan
24. Brigadier General Ayat Mohaqaqi
25. Lieutenant General Yazdanbakhsh
26. Brigadier General Asaf
27. Brigadier General Mansur Amir Ardalan
28. His Excellency Mohammad Shahnam
29. Colonel Hoseyn Va'azi
30. General 'Ezazi
31. Lieutenant General Hesameddin Bahram
32. lieutenant General Sasan
33. Brigadier General Nash'allah Khosrovi
34. Brigadier General Mehdi Mir Hoseyni
35. Lieutenant General Amir Kamyabipur
36. Major General Amir Qandahari
37. Brigadier General Habibollah Bizhan
38. His Excellency Zalali Mohad Mihan
39. Major Seyyed 'Ali Eslami
40. Brigadier General Hoseyn Qarishi

41. Colonel Rahim Ma'muri
42. His Excellency Hojjatollah
43. Major General Shapur Khorai
44. Brigadier General Tabatabai
45. Brigadier General Asmadih
46. Brigadier General Kasemi
47. Major General Mansur Shafi'i
48. Brigadier General 'Abadi
49. Brigadier General Kamal Farbansadsh
50. Brigadier General Abolfazl Mostafavi
51. Brigadier General Parviz Gohari
52. Major General Hoseyn Sarvari
53. Brigadier General Amir Hushang Filsaf Gilani
54. Major General Mehdi Ruhani
55. Lieutenant General Akbar Kampani Tabrizi
56. Lieutenant General Behdasht
57. Chief Warrant Officer Davud Zobih
58. Colonel Mash'allah Qorbani
59. Technical Captain Mahmud Biyat Mokhtari
60. Brigadier General Dadgar
61. Major Hushang Bastanmehr
62. Brigadier General Hamid Shirazi
63. Colonel Hatem Habibi
64. Colonel Hoseyn 'Alipur Esfahani
65. Brigadier General Ebrahimi

66. Brigadier General Abdollah 'Asr Jadid
67. Brigadier General Sadeq Eskuiyan
68. Major General Qamqani
69. Brigadier General Mohammad Pezeshki
70. First Lieutenant 'Ali Kia Rostami
71. Brigadier General 'Esa'allah Jahan Biglari
72. Brigadier General Rahmatollah Jahan Biglari
73. Brigadier General Shakib
74. Brigadier General Hadi Qa'ini
75. Brigadier General Pasand
76. Brigadier General Mash'allah Khosrovi
77. Brigadier General Vakili Tabatabai
78. Cadet Lieutenant 'Ali Liaqat
79. Major General Sabetasad
80. Brigadier General Khajian
81. Brigadier General Ta'at
82. Brigadier General Changiz Biyat Mahuyi
83. Lieutenant General Javad Naderi Khamseh
84. Lieutenant General Mohammad Hadi Esfandiari
85. Brigadier General Tehrani
86. Lieutenant General Mohammad Mohammadi
87. Brigadier General Mo'in Zand
88. Brigadier General Habib Khameneh'i
89. Brigadier General Amir Fazli
90. Brigadier General Jalali

91. Major General Hosseyn Mehrmand
92. Brigadier General Mehrabanzad
93. Brigadier General Shabahang
94. Major General Ostad Pir Aqali
95. Brigadier General Nuri
96. Brigadier General Biyuk Khatib Shahidi
97. Brigadier General Iraj Khorram
98. Employee Katayun Khakpur
99. Lieutenant General 'Abdollah Asar Barsin
100. His Excellency Shir Shekar
101. Lieutenant General Abolhassan Fatahi
102. Major Ahmad Kalateh Ahani
103. Colonel Mohammad Ja'far Qorbaniyan
104. Brigadier General Sho's'i
105. Honafar Fereidun Sufi
106. Honafar Mamuchehr Farjad
107. Second Lieutenant Mohammad Taqi Babayi
108. Second Lieutenant Engineer Abolfasal Hogni Farahani
109. First Lieutenant Yadollah Arasteh
110. Ordnance First Lieutenant Mohammad Khodayi Milani
111. Technical Captain Mamuchehr Delavarkhan
112. Technical Captain Mohammad 'Esmail Qomisadeh
113. Captain 'Ali Asghar Zare'sadeh
114. Captain Mostafa Falahi
115. Cadet Third Lieutenant Ayatollah Kalantari
116. Second Lieutenant Vahid Safariyan Bahri

117. Technical Cadet Lieutenant Seyyed Hadi Mir 'Abdini
118. Colonel Parvis Mash'allah Shahini Ja'fari
119. Captain 'Ali Asghar Aqa Barari
120. Cadet Lieutenant Valiollah Vakili Fard
121. Judicial Captain Seyyed Jalal Lomakan
122. Information Major Mahmud Talabi Shushdeh
123. Technical Colonel Farrokh Ja'fari
124. Pilot Colonel Farrokh Ja'fari
125. Colonel Nader Goli Nakhjiri
126. Major Entesham
127. Infantry Colonel Hassan Nik Panah
128. Colonel Ahmad Jalayer
129. Cadet Technical Second Lieutenant Habib 'Abbas Kashisan
130. Cadet Third Lieutenant Hassan Shahravanfar
131. Colonel Taheripur
132. Infantry Warrant Officer Changis Halmi
133. Technical Major Gholambosseyh Darbeheshti
134. Technical Major Hassan Khaleqi Tehrani
135. Technical Major Karim FarQani
136. Technical Captain Iraj Hashemi Niya
137. Technical Major Mohsen Sadeqi
138. Major 'Ali Kia
139. Pilot Brigadier General Mohammad Hassan Riahi
140. Brigadier General Hoseyn Farajifar
141. Pilot Brigadier General Mohammad Kamyagar Vahidi

- 142. Major Mohammad Taqi Riyufinia
- 143. Technical Brigadier General 'Ali Akbar Farivar
- 144. Major Hoseyn Rahimsadeh
- 145. Colonel Makfi-Tabris

Chief of Staff's Explanation

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Feb 80 p 11

[Text] "The decree of Ayatollah Khomeini regarding 145 military personnel will not be implemented."

"Seventy-five hundred individuals in the three forces have been purged for various reasons and, now, there is no one in the Armed Forces who can be charged with corruption, etcetera. Of course, someone might commit counter-revolutionary action while in service."

His Excellency Major General Shadmehr, Chief of the Joint Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Armed Forces, made the above statements in an interview carried by the press, radio, and television, and he responded to the questions of reporters regarding problems in the Armed Forces, the role of the Armed Forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Army Council, the demonstrations of Army and Air Force NCOs, and the expulsion of 145 Air Force personnel. You may read his answers below.

Major General Shadmehr said regarding the expulsion of 145 Air Force officers, "The verdict issued is unenforceable because, in addition to the religious judge, an Army judge and a Justice Department judge must preside over the Islamic Revolutionary military court, and the latter two judges did not preside over the court."

In continuing his remarks, Major General Shadmehr mentioned the role of the Armed Forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran and said, "In my opinion, the Army we had in the past was the most nationalist Army in the world."

While referring to the religious beliefs that led to the victory of Iran's Islamic Revolution, he said, "That coward (the former Shah) said on television: 'Those who are holding demonstrations are not Moslems; they are Islamic Marxists.' Our revolution was victorious as a result of the union of the Moslem forces. This revolution was unparalleled in the archives of the world's intelligence organizations. With the approval of the Constitution, the Armed Forces discovered its mission. What an Army we will have in the future! One thing will be paramount in the thoughts of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Armed Forces and that is that it takes its inspiration from the sublime teachings of Islam and the precept of Holy War."

Regarding the expulsion of 7500 Armed Forces personnel, Shadmehr said, "With the Revolutionary Council's approval, the responsibility for purging the Armed Forces was turned over to a five-man commission from the Ministry of National Defense, and this commission purged 7500 individuals in the three forces on various grounds and now there is no one in the Armed Forces who can be charged with corruption, etcetera. Of course, someone might commit counter-revolutionary acts while in service."

Verdict Issued by Khalkhali

Major General Shadmehr said regarding Ayatollah Khalkhali's purge, "Hojat-ol-Eslam Khamenehi invited Ayatollah Khalkhali to preside as the religious judge over the Revolution's military court. Two other judges, one from the Army and the other from the Justice Department, also were to preside over this court in order to study the files turned over by the military prosecutors. Mr. Khalkhali, however, issued his opinion regarding these individuals without the military prosecutors and the other two members of the court being present. I think that a certain group took advantage of Mr. Khalkhali's good intentions and caused this action."

Major General Shadmehr said regarding the feasibility of having a council in the Armed Forces, "The executive power cannot in any way be subordinate to the view of the officer or NCO councils, and the decisions of these councils cannot be enforceable either legally or technically. The councils can, however, give an opinion on welfare matters or, for example, an NCO can be chairman of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative Company and an officer can be under his supervision in this case. If, however, the command power and the chain of command in the Armed Forces are not preserved, to quote the nation's Imam, a jungle government will arise."

Major General Shadmehr said regarding benefits in the Armed Forces, "Under the aegis of Iran's Islamic Revolution, from now on, two million rials will be given to the family of each Armed Forces martyr, and the color and quality of the uniforms, the type of food, means of travel, assignment allowances, and right of transfer will be uniform for all Armed Forces personnel."

He said, "According to the bill that has been submitted to the Revolutionary Council, numerous benefits have been envisioned for the heirs of Armed Forces martyrs and for the disabled in the Armed Forces, and privileges have been considered for NCOs and Armed Forces employees who have completed half of their length of service."

Recall of Revolutionary Military Personnel

Major General Shadmehr was asked about the street demonstrations held by the Army and Air Force NCOs who have claimed that several faithful NCOs also have been thrown into prison. He said, "I stated previously that, if such an error has been made and people who played a role in the Revolution have been purged, the Armed Forces will recall them and apologize. Moreover, all of their rights will be protected and it will be announced to all cadres of the Armed Forces that we made a mistake regarding these individuals. I think

that, when this is announced concurrent with the end of the purge, any individual who claims to have served the Revolution must appear before the 17-man commission assigned to investigate and prove the validity of his claim. When it reaches that stage, we will apologize to him. I do not think that drawing personal conclusions and gathering together to hold demonstrations are condoned in any country or in any society. Of course, it could be that these people do not have a justifiable claim and that they want, through confused reasoning, to gain control to an extent which the Army would never allow."

NCO Demonstrations

He was asked, "Are you saying that those whose integrity is doubted should come forward to prove their integrity?"

Major General Shadmehr replied, "No, not at all. When they apply to the commission, we will tell them, 'Your continued cooperation with the Armed Forces is impossible based on this evidence.' They will then refute our evidence. When we become convinced, we will then apologize."

He was then asked, "What comment do you have to make regarding the resolution of the Army and Air Force NCOs who held demonstrations two days ago and imprisoned a division Warrant Officer?"

Major Shadmehr answered, "I do not know which resolution you mean. You must admit one fact, however, and that is the Imam's instruction that order must prevail in the Armed Forces and the chain of command must be observed. In this incident that you cited, they held a meeting, which was the first mistake, because at a time when they should have been working, and they are taking money from this country, and should have gone to service the helicopters and airplanes for carrying out their missions, they assembled together and, to quote them, issued a resolution. This role is not common practice in any Armed Forces and, in the Army of Islam, too, if each individual is to be the source of his own decision making and the opposite party, whether superior or subordinate, is forced to obey him, this government will become a jungle government as the Imam has stated."

In continuing his remarks, Major General Shadmehr said regarding the role of the Armed Forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran, "Indeed, the duty of Iran's Army is front-line defense of the external borders. Security inside the cities is the responsibility of the police and security in the villages and on the roads is the responsibility of the gendarmery. If, however, these security organizations cannot establish peace within the country, i. e., if there is extensive counter-revolutionary activity, then it is the (Revolutionary) Guards Corps turn, and, if this revolutionary apparatus also cannot take action, then the danger of partition arises and it will be the duty of the Army to intervene and establish order."

Combatting the Aggressions of the Superpowers

The Chief of the Joint Staff said regarding the aggressions of the superpowers, "They know that, even if they defeat the front line, i. e., the

Army, they still cannot occupy the country, because they know well that the people of Iran, in accordance with national duty and religious duty, which is Holy War, itself, will resist until the last drop of blood. Of course, they might decide to annihilate all of the people, but, this too not only is unprecedented, but world public opinion would not permit them to do such a thing. We are trying gradually to mobilize an Army of 20 million, and we will turn over the defense resources to the people themselves."

He was asked, "Regarding the expulsion of the Air Force officers and the two communiques issued by the Joint Staff denying the newspapers' reports, did these denials pertain only to the reports carried by the newspapers or did the denials pertain to the incident as a whole?"

Major General Shadmehr answered, "By virtue of the bill that has been approved, we have Revolutionary courts composed of one religious judge, one Justice Department judge, and one Army judge. Associated with these courts, we also have military prosecutors who study military crimes and turn over the files of those deserving of prosecution to the court and, just as you saw in Tabriz and other places, the court reviews those files. It was intended that Mr. Khalkhali, by virtue of the order that Mr Khamenehi had written for him, would be the religious judge for one of these military courts and we had intended to search for and identify the other two judges and appoint the military prosecutor when, evidently, at the invitation of those people who, in my opinion, took advantage of his good intentions, Mr Khalkhali was taken to the Air Force. I do not think that those who inspired this incident are nationalists; perhaps, they are among those well-known individuals who see their own survival in the instability of the country. They leaked the matter to the newspapers. I think, however, that any person of sound judgment would have to admit that it is impossible to investigate the situation of 145 people in one hour's time, even if there are only 145 pieces of paper to read."

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CSO: 4906

IRAN

SITUATION IN IRAN DISCUSSED BY BAKHTIAR DURING INTERVIEW

Paris LE FIGARO in French 8 Feb 80, pp 1, 7

[Interview with Shahpur Bakhtiar, in Paris suburb on 8 February, by Thierry Desjardins]

[Text] A year ago, almost to the day, 11 February 1979, Shahpur Bakhtiar left his post as prime minister in Tehran with the world coming down about his ears. The Iranian capital was in a state of insurrection. The people were attacking the barracks and looting the arsenals. The last-chance prime minister preferred to disappear into hiding, then into exile, rather than give orders to the troops, which, as it was, hardly existed any longer.

I interviewed Shahpur Bakhtiar in his apartment in the suburbs of Paris. The huge room was virtually empty, one couch and two modern armchairs its only furniture and its sole wall ornament a huge map of Iran, in front of which he sat meditating. On the occasion of this sad anniversary he reckoned up for me two balance-sheets: one that of the year of Islamic revolution, the other that of a year of opposition in exile.

[Question] What has Khomeyni done during his 12 months in power?

[Answer] He has disintegrated the country. All the provinces are in rebellion. Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Khuzistan and Baluchistan have all exploded. He has totally isolated Iran on the international level. In the eyes of the world the Iran of Khomeyni is worse than the Libya of Khadafi. The Imam has dishonored our poor country in the eyes of the nations. Economically, the balance-sheet is even more catastrophic. Our industry is not functioning at even 25 percent of its potential. Because there is still money coming in from oil production, the workers are being paid. But they are being paid to do nothing, out of simple mobocracy, and

because the factories now have neither raw materials nor market outlets. The situation cannot last forever. In any case, it is difficult to see how the economy could be started rolling again under such a Government, particularly when everyone knows that all the administrative officials of the country have fled the dictatorship and obscurantism. But it is in the political domain that the situation is the worst. There is no freedom. As in the days of the shah, anyone who wants to accomplish anything at all must be in the good graces of the mullahs. The SAWAK of the shah has been replaced by what is even worse: the SAVAMAH of Khomeyni.

[Question] According to your information, how many political prisoners are now in Khomeyni's jails?

[Answer] I don't know exactly, and neither does anyone else. But there are at least a thousand times more than last year at this same time. For under my government there were exactly six political prisoners, all told.

[Question] Don't you think that the present chaos will come to an end with the installation of the first president of the republic, the election of a parliament and the formation of a Government?

[Answer] All of that will change nothing whatsoever. The so-called Islamic Constitution gives full power to the supreme leader, that is to Khomeyni. He can do anything, and that includes overthrowing the president of the republic, Bani Sadr. I know him, he is of mediocre ability. But he is dangerous, for he has insane ideas. Nonetheless, such a system, being fundamentally false, cannot operate effectively, even if Khomeyni, in trying to reach a solution, wields the weapon of terrorism by having people arrested and executed at random, or even if, to hide his failures, he unleashes the fanaticism of the crowds, as for example in the case of this dreadful business at the American embassy.

[Question] What are your feelings on that subject?

[Answer] It is a scandal, a shame for my country, which at one time was a civilized nation. God knows that the Americans have made mistakes and committed crimes in our country by supporting the Government of the shah. But what should have been done was what we did with the British under Mossadegh. We should have closed the embassy and deported them. There was no need to behave like savages. No, Khomeyni has ruined everything, and what else could you expect? For one thing, he understands nothing about anything. He does not

even know how to read a geographical map. He has never opened a book on economics. He has no political awareness. What is more, he was born a dictator. He is obstinate and infatuated with himself. He claims that he has 98 percent of the people behind him, but how then can he explain the assaults, the rebellions in the provinces, and this opposition that keeps on growing, of which I reap the fruit here, in the form of these men and women who come to see me and who work for me as volunteers? Khomeyni says that they are counter-revolutionaries. What does that mean? Stalin said that, too, to justify his purges. No, a year ago Iran was a country where everything was still possible. Now, everything is finished, destroyed. Khomeyni would have done better to remain in Neauphle-le-Chateau.

[Question] In the year that you have been the symbol of the liberal opposition to Khomeyni's theology, what have you done?

[Answer] Every day I organize the opposition, which will soon become the Resistance. I bring together those who have lost their illusions about this revolution, and those who never had any to start with. I reunite civilians and military men, people from Tehran and the provinces. I am preparing for a future which is coming toward us with giant steps, thanks to Khomeyni himself, his mistakes and his crimes.

[Question] Do you have any contacts with what remains of the Iranian Army?

[Answer] Yes, of course. The Army has been one of the greatest victims of Khomeyni. He dismantled it, and at the same time wanted to send it to make war in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

[Question] We hear a good deal about General Jam, that former chief-of-staff who has been living in London for many years and whom you would have liked to appoint minister of war.

[Answer] General Jam is a friend of mine. He is an entirely respectable man.

[Question] You are accused of having close contacts with the shah.

[Answer] That is absolutely false, and in addition absurd. The family of the shah is trying to create a certain opposition by financing former ministers who had been party to all the scandals of the regime. Iranians will never accept the leadership of such men. As for me, I am regrouping all the

truly democratic liberals into an opposition. It is a long and exacting task that lies before us. I continue to send brochures over there, as well as pamphlets and cassettes. I have already addressed six cassettes to the Iranian people. The last one was more particularly intended for military personnel. It is an appeal to disobedience. The army does not have to obey a Government that is not a government. Before this I had sent a cassette to the Azerbaijanis; and now I am preparing others. That is how a real resistance begins.

[Question] Do you know what response these messages are meeting with?

[Answer] Yes, I have been receiving a good many replies, visits, calls. I know that the officers wept as they listened to my cassette. People have been coming to see me from nearly everywhere; reports arrive constantly from all corners of Iran.

[Question] What are your plans?

[Answer] We must wait. Khomeyni is a curse, a calamity; he is a terrible thing for my country, but calamities pass. They do considerable damage, but one day they come to an end. That is the day I am waiting for, just as are many other Iranians. In fact, I have a dream: I want Khomeyni to live on a little longer, so that he will still be alive on the day of my return to Iran. In this way, I could make him pass in judgment before a tribunal that would be perfectly legal this time. He would then answer for all the crimes that he has been committing in the last several months. What a beautiful trial that would be!

Shahpur Bakhtiar is sure of himself. He knows that he is right and that he will win in the end. Khomeyni waited for 13 years in exile before he was successful in overthrowing the shah. Bakhtiar believes that he will not have to wait such a long time.

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CSO: 4900

REVOLUTIONARY COURTS MERGED WITH JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Feb 80 p 3

[Excerpt] Yesterday afternoon Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Abdolkarim Musavi Ardabili held a press conference and discussed the following subjects and answered questions: leadership of the republic, the strike at the foundation for the deprived, holding two-stage elections, and new appointments.

Ardabili said in connection with those whose property was confiscated and then restored that sometimes documents turn up after confiscation that cause a change of opinion. On the basis of prior and defective documents, even a religious judge will issue a second opinion when confronted by a mistake. Regarding the strikes that are going on in some departments, it is not clear whether what the people say is right or merely revolutionary rhetoric. "However, when I talked to them on Thursday it was agreed that the decision of the court of the foundation of deprived would be carried out, but that if there is evidence or documents in our brothers' hands contradicting this decision they would be presented for a new opinion."

Ardabili commented in regard to the strike that is going on in the foundation that in his opinion there was no real reason for it. To the extent that he was involved in the country's problems, the strikes have no grounds in regard to the organization of the foundation. This applies as well to factories and private companies in some of which the managers have been made hostages.

But there are behind-the-scenes aspects to this kind of problem, for example, where there is bad management, either intentional or unintentional. A group may have a bad reputation but still be of great use to us.

Some problems also arise from the high level of expectations and rhetoric which has been fed to workers. How many mistaken impressions have they gotten from these words and how fear of consequences have disappeared so that there is no unity.

"Yesterday I was at a gathering of workers from a government organization. They asked for an increase in pay. Some of them had worked 25 years in the oppressed times but after only 1 year of revolution had gotten an equal raise, that is, a 1,500-toman increase in their wages. Yet they

are still working to say that they expected more from the revolution. Of course, they should not be considered traitors or agitators. We do know that the victory of our revolution has made us many enemies who have many tools both inside and outside. Their only motive is to make the situation as bad as possible."

He said in regard to the influence of irresponsible people in the revolutionary structure, as in the foundation, that this arises from two problems. One is the purging that is going on in the affected organizations. "We have kicked people out of the foundation. The striking workers are mistaken about those people against who they make disclosures because these same people have already been purged and are now in jail with my name on their files. Some of those purged were freemasons and because the foundation is revolutionary I also threw out members of the Lions Club. However, our purification of the foundation is not enough. It has been decided to have a widespread purge, but as a result of the activities of our striking brothers it will begin with them, with their permission. They say that in the foundation there are two groups, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary. First of all it must be seen whether they themselves are a revolutionary group truly so or not. Therefore, we have begun the process with the revolutionaries. However, in tens of organizations many things have been done, the most important of which is dividing the centralized administration and spreading it among local managers. In 20 provincial and municipal centers there is an office of the foundation which has a five-man council drawn from organizations from the same city. They will be responsible for planning programs and related matters. We will examine their accounts every 6 months."

Ardabili said in regard to the appointment of a general prosecutor, given out today (yesterday) by the Imam, that the constitution sets out the conditions for appointing the president of the Supreme Council (Divan), the general prosecutor and in principle the Assembly of Religious Judges. A few days ago this responsibility was given to the Imam along with other duties by the leadership because now the protectorate council and regency directorate have taken the power of deliberation and policy. The Imam's object in making this appointment was for us to have a judiciary with special powers and organization but one which is not 100 percent knowledgeable of Islam. We also have a revolutionary court created out of need. Now that the people are under a new order, they cannot be without a free, strong and fair religious court.

We have reached the point where we must plan for new organizations to replace the existing ones, including one to supercede the revolutionary courts. Ardabili said in answer to the question about what would be done in this period concerning the revolutionary courts that of course no time frame could be designated since it was a very difficult problem and they were only at the first stage of their studies. However, they are trying to finish the job quickly and they would hurry as much as possible but not with such haste as to impair the result.

A plan does not exist which would merge the prosecutor and revolutionary courts with the judiciary. Ardabili commented on relations and cooperation with the president and the revolutionary council. He said that Bani Sadr had close cooperation with the council over the period of a year and the members were in touch with each other day and night over problems that constantly arose. He had confidence in him and considered his social and political thinking good. The nation has also given him its vote and it is truly said that in this election the will of the nation was demonstrated.

His close cooperation with the Revolutionary Council began after he returned to Iran. The Revolutionary Council was established before the return of the Imam. He had close cooperation with the Assembly of Experts at first and later with the Revolutionary Council. He is a worthy colleague. This is not to say that there have been no differences of opinion, but his stature was such that when elections came along he was a candidate and got the votes.

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CSO: 4906

MINISTER ANNOUNCES WAY TO END UNEMPLOYMENT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Jan 80 p 11

[Text] Employment opportunities for unemployed workers and highschool graduates will be provided in the form of cooperatives and self-help projects. The deputy for employment and profit-sharing of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs described the employment plan and the manner of its implementation. He said: One important factor in production is a skilled manpower. Under the current conditions prevailing in the country, many production and industrial units do not have the possibility of absorbing unemployed manpower, even experts, while in the government sector there is already a manpower inflation. I believe that in order to absorb the unemployed, new positions must be created aimed at securing jobs for the unemployed as productive and skilled persons.

These new projects are cooperative units that will be created with the participation of the people. The employment plan that was recently approved by the Revolutionary Council embraces all industrial, agricultural, developmental and especially road-building activities. One of the principal conditions for economic and social development is the existence of communications, and the creation of a good communications system helps the formation of a sound economic framework. In view of the fact that at the present time the roads in the rural areas of the provinces are less than 20 percent of the desired level, employment can be provided at a much higher level through road-building projects. The deputy minister added that development, agricultural and industrial projects must be implemented by cooperatives, with the participation of unemployed highschool graduates and other unemployed persons and with the cooperation of government officials. In each province an organ called Center for the Expansion of Product and Development Services, operating under the supervision of government officials, should be established, which will register the total number of unemployed persons and experts in the province.

Cooperatives actively operating in the field of agriculture will be responsible for studying the possibilities for expansion of agricultural lands, dam construction and irrigation in the district, and for submitting plans to the center, to be implemented after examination and approval.

In addition, cooperatives engaged in the industrial field must complete requisite studies on existing raw materials and the possibility of creating product industries in the district. Similarly, by the creation of rural centers in rural districts electrical networks, residential units, hospitals and water-supply facilities could be constructed, and thus embark on development activities. The expenditures for these plans, for every province and for area development credits, can be provided by the appropriation of one day's income from oil and gas. With the implementation of these plans, profitable jobs for the unemployed will be created, and all of the nation's unemployed, who number less than 500,000, can be put to work.

The deputy minister also stated that because of the inflated number of office workers in the governmental sector, and because of the discontinuation of some of the big construction projects and the existence of difficulties for their implementation, employment opportunities in these two sectors are limited. For this reason employment projects will be implemented in the form of cooperatives and self-help plans by unemployed high-school graduates and workers themselves.

The deputy for employment of the Ministry of Labor then said that the continuing implementation of this plan can create other employment opportunities in the future for cooperative employment groups. Centers for the expansion of product and industrial services are to be organized in the provinces, and on the basis of executive regulations, the accomplishment of work will be extended to employment cooperatives. Each member of the cooperative will be furnished with a share of up to 5,000 rials. After the registration of the cooperative, its capital will be deposited in one of the provincial branches of Bank Saderat (the name of which will be changed). The cooperatives will also be able to get an interest-free loan of up to 35,000 toman for a start.

The deputy minister of labor ended his statements by saying that the most important goal of the implementation of this plan is the creation of (new) fields of employment outside the government organizations in institutions.

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CSO: 4906

GOVERNOR ANNOUNCES COOPERATIVES FOR KHUZESTAN JOBLESS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Mar 80 p 8

[Text] With the establishment of cooperative companies and government capital, the unemployed will be put into production tasks. This statement was made by the provincial governor of Khuzestan in a speech delivered this afternoon at Hosaynieh 'Azam located in Ahvaz on the unemployment issue and production of work.

A group of unemployed and the people of this city participated. Sayyed Mohammad Gharazi, the provincial governor of Khuzestan, said that today's unemployment had been caused by wrong programs of the past. He said today this issue had created some problems for us which we would try to resolve. The governor general of Khuzestan referred to the importance of production in keeping prices balanced and said: "A society in which production and prices go up, inflation is created and this was the model policy of the former regime which put the people into unproductive work. However, we want to do other than that in today's Islamic Republic. Some of the people should participate in production tasks." The governor general added: "One of our problems is the closing of some of the organizations which were planned by the former regime, organizations which we will not have in our program, such as, nuclear power plants. With the termination of the project in Khuzestan, many have joined the number of unemployed. Therefore it is necessary that they too be absorbed by the new work atmosphere. And to solve the unemployment problem we will take action in establishing production cooperative companies with the help of the unemployed. By making arrangements for training courses and putting capital at their disposal, we will put the unemployed into production tasks. After the group finds financial power, the government's initial capital will be returned to the government. This is the only thing we can do in the Islamic Republic to become self-dependent, that is, to produce for our own consumption. In this respect we should start with small industries of course, the priority in establishing cooperative companies will be with those who have skills or those who soon become skilled. This will be along with holding training courses." The governor general of Khuzestan addressed the unemployed and said: "We need all of your help in identifying and introducing all of the unemployed to us. If this is done you will have helped us." Then he referred to the existence of oil in that province and profiteering of contractors in

the former regime. After analysis he concluded and said: "In the Islamic Republic we believe that the people who have made the revolution should accept the responsibilities themselves because in Iran's Islamic Republic there is no separation between the people and the government."

Referring to the existing problem in Khuzestan, Eng Gharazi went over the flooding in that province and said in the recent flooding in Khuzestan about 30,000 houses were ruined and need renovation. In this gathering a group of jobless high school graduates of Ahvaz asked why they had been attacked during a sit-in demonstration in the Education Department. One of them said that during the week that we had held a sit-in demonstration in the Education Department, no one from the governor general's office listened to us. We should inform you that the sit-in demonstration was our last means because no matter where we were sent, nobody gave us an answer and inevitably we made a sit-in demonstration. Here we announce that we want the names of those who attacked us to be revealed. The governor general responded that because of the press of work we would not come and see you and I should inform you that in response to your demand we can only show you the solution and say that in a roundtable radio and television broadcast you can discuss your problems with the other party and let the people make the judgment.

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CSO: 4906

COUNCIL TO OVERSEE PROPOSED FOREIGN TRADE

Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 4 Mar 80 p 10

[Text] Dr Ali Rashidi, member of the country's economic association made a speech and expressed his view points on Iran's postrevolutionary foreign trade policy.

Dr Rashidi said after the shameful coup of 28 Mordad, under the shadow of military and political ties with the West, especially the United States, and accepting a Western pattern, the state authorities were not able to take independent decisions regarding economic growth and development.

On the other hand, the ill management, selfishness, growing difficulties and state of being misled derived from genuine sovereignty ties with the West, had thrown its shadow on all of the goals, policies of the anti-national government plans of the deposed shah. The result of continuation and attachments which affects economic and international relations at present and in the future can be found in the irregular exploitation of oil resources, establishment of nonessential industries, nuclear power assembly plants, contamination by import of thousands of unnecessary consumer goods, confusion of economic issues, scientific, technological and agricultural ties and even moral and psychological, and the waning of independence in economic and international policy, lack of attention to establishing healthy and balanced relation with all countries based on maintaining national interests, wasting wealth, giving bribes and concessions to the Eastern bloc and bestowing gifts to the family of colonialism in the region. These can be summarized as the most major reasons for destroying Iran politically, socially and economically. Dr Rashidi said: "In my opinion Iran's foreign policy can be based on cooperation and friendship with all nations and nonaggressive governments respecting our nation's independence and freedom, friendship and cooperation with all Moslem nations, maintaining and strengthening friendly relations, not interfering in the affairs of others, ties with the oppressed nations of the Third World, not having any ties with any of the military camps, and economic and political cooperation with free and independent countries."

Dr Rashidi added: "Considering the proposed principles of foreign policy and with the help of the economic system included in the constitutional law, the principles ruling the economic relations can be proposed as follows:

"To use oil in foreign trade for providing foreign exchange requirements, exports to be proportionate with demands, increasing the price of oil by taking changes and level of inflation in countries exporting goods to Iran into consideration, using international economic relations in reaching independence and self-sufficiency, to avoid export of raw materials and paying attention to producing and exporting known commodities, active and effective participation in all universal economic relations with all countries."

Dr Rashidi said: "Considering the principles of foreign trade policy, the following goals should be followed: To have variation in nonoil exports, selling oil products and cutting off the hands of the Western middle men, concluding agreements on oil and other export commodities, reducing the volume of import consumer goods, expanding commercial and industrial trade with Eastern European countries, expanding trade with small industrial countries, stimulating production and export of raw materials and intermediate goods, taking action in establishing an Asian common market, supporting air, surface and sea transportation companies, cooperation and exchange of views with all countries exporting raw material and intermediate goods."

Dr Rashidi said: "It is clear that following the above goals in Iran's international trade would require return to economic stability and order in the country, providing capabilities and using the country's production capacities."

In the end, Dr Rashidi suggested establishing a council called the Supervision Council on Iran's International Economic Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consist of responsible authorities on international economic relations.

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CSO: 4906

PILOT STRIKE HALTS PARS AIR FLIGHTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Mar 80 p 12

[Text] The differences between the ground and air personnel of Pars Air has resulted in the resignation of all air personnel and consequently all of the flights of Pars Air have been cancelled.

Dr 'Alavi Tabataba'i, representative of the Foundation for the Poor, said to PARS News Agency that in order to resolve the difference between the two groups, a meeting was held with the participation of representatives of the Imam, president, and the foundation in presence of Ayatollah Eshraqi both in Pars Air, and in the Heart Hospital and detailed negotiations were held. Unfortunately, because of aggravations made by Pars Air ground personnel the differences were not resolved. The foundation asked the two groups to go back to work so that the purging komiteh would start to work after that.

It was also agreed to pay severance pay to some of the ground personnel, but they refused to accept. The foundation believes that the two groups should resolve their differences through negotiations.

About the future of the Pars Air Co, Dr 'Alavi said: If the differences between the two groups are not resolved, it is possible that Pars Air would be put at the disposal of another organization and continue to function or probably it would be terminated.

At present 2.5 million rials is the daily loss due to the cancellation of the flights. In addition, Pars Air does not have any airplanes of its own. They are all rented from Holland. For some time, the payment of rent on them has been delayed.

Anyway, I believe that the differences between the two groups should be resolved as soon as possible and the flying group should return to work.

On the other hand, although all of the pilots and co-pilots of Pars Air have submitted their resignations to the Foundation of the Poor, a group of employees of Pars Air have referred to KEYHAN asking about the fate of the employees.

KEYHAN New Agency reports from Mehrabad International Airport that it is 43 days now that all of the employees of Pars Air Co have gone on strike.

Yesterday also a group of Pars Air employees went to KEYHAN and stated that following the occurrence of the existing differences in the company the authorities of the Foundation of the Poor and other government authorities have not taken any positive step for the company to start to work and that about 180 employees of this company who have families have not received any salary and do not know what to do.

They also added that the differences started when some asked for purging of the company.

Following occurrence of more severe differences, the company closed and the authorities have not so far been able to resolve the problem. KEYHAN correspondent reports that yesterday all of the pilots and co-pilots of Pars Air submitted their resignation to the Foundation for the Poor and stated that under the existing atmosphere it is not logical for them to work in that company.

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CSO: 4906

ONLY PEYKAN, CITROEN CARS TO BE BUILT IN IRAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jan 80 p 9

[Text] Henceforth only two kinds of cars will be built in Iran. These will be the Renault (Zhian) and the Peykan.

Mahmud Ahmadzadeh, minister of industries and mines, stated this during an announcement of India's nonparticipation in the economic embargo of Iran.

Ahmadzadeh also spoke yesterday about the UNIDO and future Indian assistance to Iran.

Ahmadzadeh said: The result that we gained from this conference is that no results are to be had from this type of international meetings. In these long, drawn-out scenes of papershuffling, love for luxury is still prevalent.

The minister of industries and mines added: "In these sessions, discussions concerning industrial cooperation between Iran and India resulted in India's announcement that not only will it not participate in the economic embargo of Iran, but rather will undertake necessary economic cooperation with Iran. Such is the case in the previously-concluded agreement between India and Iran for the production of iron ore which is needed by the Abia-ye Mostaqim factories in Ahvaz. A group from India will travel to Iran next week to exchange views on this and other matters."

Concerning Iran's role in the UNIDO the minister of industries and mines said: "We have no obligation to this organization and should any assistance be given, it will be contributed via OPEC."

Ahmadzadeh added: "If we, like India, should want to free ourselves from dependencies, we must lower the level of our expectations. This means that we should avoid longing for luxuries and the like, and strive as hard as possible to liberate ourselves from dependencies." Regarding the problems facing domestic industries, the minister of industries and mines said: A circular has been sent to all factories and production units, according to which they are required to present statistical data concerning amounts of raw materials, consumption, production and related difficulties. Also

an article has been approved by the Revolutionary Council based on the consent of the banks, according to which necessary credits for such units will be placed at the disposal of the government. Meanwhile, it has to be emphasized that none of the debts of this kind of units will be payable until a complete auditing has been accomplished. Auditing will continue until March, 1981. The ministry has also formed a commission to examine and deal with domestic economic problems, as well as difficulties stemming from the U.S. economic sanctions.

Thus the commission has submitted the Regulations of the Workers' Council to the Revolutionary Council, based on which the councils will have supervisory powers in the factories' affairs in cooperation with the management. We hope that the implementation of those regulations will gradually reduce the level of difficulties existing in our units. In the end, Ahmadzadeh spoke about the types of cars to be produced in Iran: A council called the Council of Planning has been formed for this purpose. After taking into consideration all the aspects, the Council decided that two kinds of passenger automobiles will be built. These will be the Peykan, produced by the Iran National Factories, and the Renault (Zhian) of the Saipa Company. General Motors will also continue to make the Jeep and Jeep station wagon.

Thus we are making efforts so that the Iranian auto industry will be capable of standing on its own feet in the future and no longer be in need of foreign help.

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CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TORTURE REPORT--On Tuesday, 26 February, in Paris, the Danish medical group from the humanitarian organization Amnesty International published a report on a former Iraqi prisoner "who was seriously tortured during his detention." This is "the first detailed medical report drawn up on a case of torture in Iraq." In its bulletin, Amnesty International asserts that Burhan Al-Shawi, a 24-year-old Iraqi printer, was arrested in November 1978 by Iraqi authorities and immediately sent to the general security headquarters to be tortured. "He was held there for 9 days," the humanitarian organization states, "during which time he suffered painful and practically uninterrupted torture: He was slapped, punched, beaten and whipped. Starting on the third day, the torture grew more brutal and more systematic. He was tortured until he lost consciousness. He was deeply burned on 35 different places on his body with a metal object heated electrically. A bottle-like object was forced into his rectum. At the end of 9 days," Amnesty International adds, "Burhan Al-Shawi was released. He had to spend the next 2 months in bed and the 35 burns on his body took 3 months to heal," the bulletin states. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Feb 80 p 5] 11,464

CSO: 4800

PUBLIC OPPOSES NEW SETTLEMENTS IN WEST BANK

TA251436 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Mar 80 p 1 TA

[Text] The majority of the Israeli public opposes the establishment of new settlements in Judaea and Samaria and a majority also opposes financial investment in settlements in view of the economic situation. These are the findings of a nationwide opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute for HA'ARETZ.

Forty-eight percent versus 38 percent oppose the establishment of new settlements and 56 percent versus 32 percent oppose financial investment in the settlements.

Four percent are willing to support the establishment of new settlements and financial investments in them only under certain conditions, such as: non-provocative settlements, only settlements necessitated by security considerations, without publicity and without infringing on the peace agreement, financial investments to be made only in settlements not earmarked for evacuation, unlike Yamit, for example, provided the investment does not harm social betterment and that the investments are made in existing settlements rather than in new ones.

Eight percent of the polled professed to have no opinion on the subject of settlements.

Opposition to the establishment of new settlements and to financial investment in them is particularly high among socioeconomically advanced groups.

Prominent among the opposers are academicians, members of the professions, administrative employees, persons from higher income brackets and Israelis of European or American origin.

The poll encompassed a representative cross section of 1,200 men and women who had been privately interviewed throughout the country.

DAYAN INDICATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ABOLISHED

TA211143 Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 21 Mar 80 p 2 TA

[Text] The Arabs of the territories should be given political freedom, so long as they are not engaged in violence, and the military government should be unilaterally abolished, and even if the autonomy talks fail, said former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan at a graduation ceremony in the Law and Justice Department of the Tel Aviv University yesterday.

Mr Dayan warned that Israel will not benefit from a failure of the autonomy talks, even if it cannot be held formally responsible for such a failure, and even if it is willing to honor every commitment specified in the Camp David accords.

Dayan hinted that should the efforts to reach an arrangement in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza fail, the Camp David formula is liable to become shelved, but a worse proposition might replace it. "If we do not manage to put life in the autonomy plan, it is liable to grow stale in the archives, but other proposals will replace it. Anyone who is listening to voices emanating from Europe and America can understand in which direction the winds are blowing." Hence, he added, one does not get rig of the problem by the simple fact that Jordan and the Palestinians did not join the talks, or that the Egyptians raised unacceptable demands.

Mr Dayan proposed not to make light of the positive side of the Camp David accords, to which the President of the United States is a signatory. One should study the Camp David agreements, while comparing them with other formulas, such as the Roger's plan. Thus, even if the talks should fail, Israel ought to implement unilaterally those parts of the Camp David accords it can realize on its own, if not to the letter, then at least in a broad outline.

CSO: 4805

STOLEN ARMS WORRY IDF AS THOUSANDS SAID MISSING

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Mar 80 p 3

[Article by Yoram Bar]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — The IDF has failed to control widespread thefts of weapons from soldiers and army bases, and thousands of stolen weapons are now in the hands of the public, Tat-Aluf Baruch Arbel, of the military police, told *The Jerusalem Post* yesterday.

Arbel said that some of the stolen weapons find their way to criminals who "order" them for armed robberies. Some weapons reach the country's Arab population, which Arbel termed grave danger. In the future, it may lead to very unpleasant situations. But all our efforts to prevent the phenomenon have failed."

Arbel said that apart from arms held by IDF soldiers, "tens of thousand of weapons are in the hands of border settlements, guard companies, the Civil Guard, reserve soldiers and others." He said this made it very difficult to ensure complete control.

Chief-of-Staff Rav Aluf Rafael Eitan receives a weekly report on stolen or lost weapons and a senior military source told *The Post* that Eitan personally handles almost every case and instructs subordinates on how they are to deal with them.

The source said Eitan has made changes in regulations for guarding armouries, and large sums have been invested to step-up control.

According to Arbel, IDF troops manage to lose one weapon a day in the various bases, mostly because of negligence. But there are also many cases of loss during military exercises.

The IDF has no registration of weapons according to the units in which they are held. Sometimes, when a weapon is found, IDF authorities are unable to locate the unit from which it was taken.

A recent suggestion to register weapons by unit and computerise the information was rejected for budgetary reasons.

CSO: 4820

POLICE STRUCTURE TO REMAIN INTACT, BRASS DECIDES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Mar 80 p 3

[Text]

After an intensive re-examination, police brass yesterday decided to retain the present structure of the force for the coming five years.

The senior police command met for about seven hours at police headquarters in Jerusalem and decided not to do away with the district commands, to leave the Border Police and Civil Guard with their current duties, and to place the war against organized crime at the top of police priorities.

Since Herzl Shafir took over command of the 18,000-strong force three months ago, the police have been engaged in intensive self-examination designed to revamp the force in the light of long-term goals. This programme has been dubbed "Tirosh" (must, or new wine) by the former IDF chief of operations, who has brought a number of army experts with him to help the police acquire planning techniques used in the defence establishment.

Yesterday's session was the first of six summing-up sessions to be held during the coming weeks

designed to produce a detailed five-year plan to be submitted to the cabinet.

The decision not to do away with the District Commands reinforces an earlier police reaction to a similar proposal made by the Shimron Committee on crime in 1978. A police spokesman yesterday explained that doing away with the five police districts would "atomize" the force into local units, as exist in the U.S. It was decided to maintain a national police force with a central command.

Intelligence, especially on the field level, will receive greater emphasis than in the past and greater use will be made of computers in correlating information on crime and criminals, sources said.

Final conclusions will be submitted to Interior and Police Minister Yosef Burg on April 30. Shafir has already let it be known that his emphasis on "quantitative methods" in planning is designed to make the political echelon co-responsible in determining what kind of police force Israel will have for the next five years.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

AL-SADAT APPROVES AGRICULTURAL PLAN--President Anwar as-Sadat yesterday gave the green light to the plan of Israeli multi-millionaire Saul Eisenberg to reclaim 500,000 acres (two million dunams) of Nile delta land with the aid of Israeli advisers and technicians. According to Israel TV correspondent Ehud Ya'ari, as-Sadat met with Eisenberg yesterday for the fourth time in recent weeks and said that he wanted to see the project launched by the beginning of next month. [Excerpt] [TA270707 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Mar 80 p 1 TA]

SOVIET DROPOUTS REPORTED--Only 4 of a group of 102 Soviet Jewish immigrants, just arrived in Vienna, will emigrate to Israel. This is the highest percentage of dropouts ever recorded among a single group of Soviet Jews and Jewish agency immigration officials in the Austrian capital called it a black day. The Russian Jews came from Moscow and from Leningrad. [Text] [TA252128 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 25 Mar 80 TA]

HEBRON SETTLEMENT OPPOSED--Tel Aviv--A narrow majority of the public opposes Jewish settlement inside Hebron, according to the March JERUSALEM POST poll conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Center among a representative selection of 1,300 adults. Question: In your opinion should Jewish settlement be allowed in Hebron? Yes--46.3 percent, no--51.4 percent, do not know--2.3 percent. An analysis according to party found the following correlation of support: revival movement--100 percent, Likud--61.54 percent, NRP--71.4 percent, Agudat Yisra'el Bloc--68.6 percent, labor--36.4 percent, Shay-DMC Democrats--14.3 percent. [Excerpts] [TA260931 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 26 Mar 80 p 3 TA]

BANK FALASTIN'S ACTIVITY BANNED--The Gaza Strip authorities banned a convention of Bank Falastin's shareholders today. Our correspondent Bassam Ja'bar notes that this bank has been operating without the military authorities' consent for a few months. The bank was promised approval for renewed activity, but on the condition it meets the ordinary requirements of the Bank of Israel. The directorate of Bank Falastin does not accept this condition. [Text] [TA201421 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 20 Mar 80 TA]

POPULATION CENSUS REPORTED--Israel's population will reach a total of 4 million inhabitants only in October 1981. Israel's population today numbers 3,850,000 people, out of which 620,000 are non-Jewish immigrants (including residents of East Jerusalem). Today 432,000 inhabitants live in Gaza and 700,000 in Judaea and Samaria. This was revealed yesterday by government statistician Dr Moshe Sigron, with the publication of Israel's yearly book of statistics for 1979. [Excerpt] [TA251151 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Mar 80 p 3 TA]

SITUATION IN POST-CAMP DAVID JORDAN ANALYZED

Return to Arab Fold

Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Mar 80 pp 7, 12

[Article by Jean Gueyras]

[Text] Area: 68,000 square kilometers (Transjordan); 6,633 square kilometers (Cisjordan)

Population: 2.3 million inhabitants (Transjordan); 750,000 inhabitants (Cisjordan)

Principal cities (approximate estimates): Amman: 700,000 inhabitants; Zarka: 245,000 inhabitants; Irbid: 116,000 inhabitants; Jerash: 50,000 inhabitants.

Built on seven hills, the city of Amman is unceasingly encroaching on the desert which surrounds it. The new, well-to-do quarter of Shmeisani, which bristles with second-home luxury residences and international class hotels, is in constant development. The real estate boom is going full swing, and the Jordanian capital is increasingly stretching toward the west in the direction of the university which is located more than 10 kilometers from the center of town. The lower part of the city teems with shops whose display counters are crumbling under the weight of merchandise imported from all the corners of the world. Long lines of modern cars are beginning to pose inextricable problems for the traffic services.

The foreign visitor, amazed by this profusion of wealth, has difficulty realizing the serious economic problems confronting the country. He curses the fine rain which, this winter, has inundated the city, transforming its streets into as many quagmires, without recognizing the fact that this providential rain is a gift from the heavens for a country harshly affected by 5 years of severe drought. However, he rather quickly realizes that, in the inflation sector (15 percent per year), Jordan is as badly-off as some European countries and that the other side of the coin of the country's prosperity consists of a continual escalation of prices, including the

price of gasoline which recently again increased 30 percent. The authorities have attempted to offset the high cost of living by massively subsidizing prime necessity products, to ease to a certain degree the lot of the most disadvantaged categories of the population.

However, more radical measures were required to put an end to the deterioration of the country's economic situation. And the departure in December 1979 of Mudhar Budran, exhausted by 3 1/2 years in government, is explained by the palace's desire to make the bases of Jordanian economy healthier, an economy seriously disrupted by a policy which could be summed up by Guizot's well-known expression: "Enrich yourself." The new prime minister, Sharif Abdel Hamid Charaf, who enjoys the total confidence of the king, was not long in sounding the alarm by announcing in his investiture speech an austerity program whose basic purpose is to reduce the public consumption of a country "which is living beyond its means," by giving priority to the productive sectors of the national economy.

New taxes were established to this end, and motorists were the first to pay the costs of this economic recovery policy. However, as we were told in confidence by a small shopkeeper, these measures principally affect the economically disadvantaged, who are already heavily oppressed by the general rise in prices, which leave the wealthy relatively untouched, as they are able to face up to the many burdens imposed by the public treasury without blinking an eye.

In fact, inflation is nourished in part by the credit transfers effected by the some 400,000 Jordanians--most of them Palestinians from occupied territories--who emigrated to Gulf oil countries. In 1979, these credit transfers totaled over \$700 million, which are the origin of the extraordinary economic boom the country is experiencing. The exodus of specialized manpower, attracted by high salaries in the Gulf region, has, however, had harmful effects from some industry sectors, which were suddenly deprived of the services of qualified workmen, who had to be replaced at a moment's notice by laborers "imported" from Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, South Korea and the Philippines.

The Jordanian economy is being kept afloat by the aid furnished by the countries which participated in the Arab summit in Bagdad in November 1978; thus Jordan is to receive annual aid of \$1.25 billion from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Libya and Algeria. In 1979, this sum was not totally paid, as Tripoli and Algiers did not honor their commitments.

These subsidies, which in large measure offset the decrease in American aid, marked the return of Jordan to the Arab fold. However, it would be a mistake to say that the rallying of Amman to the bloc of Arab countries which are opposed to President Sadat's peace initiative was motivated by the sole concern for bailing out the Jordanian economy.

Fear of "Separate Peace"

Jordan's opposition to the Israeli-Egyptian peace process undertaken by President Sadat in November 1977 is based on the firm conviction that such a process can only result in a "separate peace" that would leave the Palestinian question unresolved, which is largely contributing to instability in the region. However, before definitively rejecting the Camp David "process," King Hussein had attempted a final demarche with the Americans by sending them a 14-point questionnaire asking for certain specific information about Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Washington's answers were judged to be deceptive and ended in convincing the Jordanian sovereign that the Camp David accords did not in any way take into consideration the Jordanian point of view and interests.

When King Hussein received the French press 10 days ago, he showed his bitterness in the face of Washington's attitude which, according to him, has deliberately sabotaged the "positive and promising measures" which had been taken on the eve of President Sadat's initiative to find an honorable solution to the crisis in the Near East. "After President Sadat's sudden visit to Jerusalem," he said, "the Americans hesitated a moment before profoundly supporting the Israeli-Egyptian initiative. The previous peace process which, for us, was the only valid process, was derailed and replaced by a new formula which, as we see it, did not result in the overall peace we were seeking." Former Minister of Information Adnan Abu Awdah, a Palestinian who became one of the counselors of the king, who reportedly is thinking about conferring upon him the post of Jordan's permanent delegate to the United Nations, feels that the question of knowing whether the Amman government will come over to the side of the Camp David negotiations does not make sense. "The real problem," he told us, "is rather knowing whether the Israelis are ready to accept the principles contained in UN Resolution 242 and evacuate the occupied territories. In fact, the Israelis are suffering from an ailment brought on by the intoxication of victory and want at one and the same time to have peace and the territories, something that is totally inadmissible. Under these circumstances, what could we say to the Israelis at Camp David? Are we to bless the perpetuation of the occupation with the euphemism that they call self-determination?"

The attitude of Adnan Abu Awdah is all the more significant because he had been one of the rare personalities of the Amman regime to favorably receive President Sadat's initiative in 1977. "The Arab drama," he told us, "lies in the fact that we only have one option: peace, whereas the Israelis have two: peace and war." Adnan Abu Awdah thinks that there is only one way to put an end to this "imbalance." "We must create elements susceptible of giving us this second option, by significantly reinforcing Arab military power. Only then will the Americans and Israelis, who know perfectly well the limits of our margin for maneuvering, will take us seriously."

Distrust with respect to Washington which a few years ago was still considered "the surest ally" of Jordan is general in the political circles of Amman.

This distrust, which is often accompanied by sharp feelings of deception and bitterness, was reinforced even more at the beginning of 1979 when it became clear that Washington was at the point of letting go of the Shah. A personal friend of the Iranian sovereign, King Hussein had not hesitated to go to Tehran in November 1978 when the situation there was deteriorating rapidly. Finally, the Jordanian leaders drew a lesson from the events in Tehran by distancing themselves from Washington to henceforth rely solely on their own forces and those of the Arab countries which are facing the same threats and dangers.

The most serious of these threats for the Jordanians is the "separate peace" between Egypt and Israel, which succeeded in dangerously dividing the moderate Arab countries. They feel, however, that the Arab "summit" in Bagdad limited the damage by avoiding the shattering of the Arab world and by establishing a new inter-Arab solidarity to which Jordan rallied without ulterior motives by normalizing relations with most of the Arab States. The test of this new will of the moderate Arab countries to nevermore allow themselves to have their policy dictated to them was supplied by the entrance into Afghanistan of Soviet troops. While bitterly regretting and severely condemning Moscow's behavior, the Jordanians refuse to commit themselves to a common undertaking "under the protection of the American umbrella" to face up to a possible Soviet threat against the Gulf region, a threat which they judge to be nonexistent.

Reconciliation with the PLO

For Jordan and its moderate allies, the problem of the entrance of Soviet troops into Afghanistan is not "priority." "The impasse in which the Palestinian problem finds itself," we were told in this regard by Adnan Abu Awdah, echoing the opinion widespread in the political quarters of Amman, "for us represents a more serious danger than the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We do not like and condemn what the Russians are doing in this country. But that does not mean that we should abandon our principal preoccupation, which is and will continue to be Palestine. And if we are called upon to defend ourselves, we can only do so by settling the Palestinian problem. That is the almost general opinion of the Arabs."

Jordan is much more uneasy over the persistence of the Palestinian impasse because it is the Arab country most interested in the future of the Palestinians, who make up more than one half of its population. The dual opposition of King Hussein and the PLO to the Camp David accords has greatly facilitated the reconciliation between the Hashemite sovereign and the Palestinian Organization. The bloody events of the battle of Amman in 1970 are no longer anything more than a distant memory which tends to be increasingly blurred in men's minds. The Palestinians in Jordan have found their place in Jordanian society and enjoy the same rights as Jordanian citizens, benefiting fully from the economic prosperity of the Hashemite kingdom. For these Palestinians, King Hussein is no longer the enemy who has to be destroyed, but an ally in the common struggle for the recovery

of occupied territories. However, even the rich representatives of the Palestinian middle-class in Amman and Irbid, closely integrated into the Jordanian regime, are not remaining indifferent in the face of the old and tenacious Palestinian aspiration to set up an independent state, of which the PLO has become the symbol over the years.

The normalization of relations between Jordan and the PLO, which was established at the time of the Hussein-Arafat meeting in December 1979, was founded on clear and precise bases and was made possible only as the result of concessions granted principally by the Palestinian Organization. Jordan, which intends to maintain state-to-state relations with the PLO, denies it any jurisdiction over Palestinians in the kingdom who are considered full-fledged Jordanian citizens and does not recognize the PLO's right to have an armed Palestinian presence in its territory with a view to combating the Hebrew state. Arafat was forced to abandon many demands. The PLO chief, on the other hand, secured the right to open an office of this organization in Amman. However, the office will be run by Gen Abdel Razzak Yehia, a mere "functionary," of the Palestinian administration. It will have only a representation role and will not perform any politically important function.

The swing to the right which took place during the last few years within the leadership of the PLO facilitated the Jordanian-Palestinian reconciliation to the conditions of King Hussein and greatly contributed to the harmonizing of relations between the Palestinian organization and the Amman authorities. The \$150 million support fund established by the Arab "summit" in Bagdad to aid the inhabitants of occupied territories to meet the economic pressures of Israel is managed by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian commission headed by Abu Jihad, one of the most visible PLO leaders. In 1979, this commission distributed more than \$70 million, systematically favoring the moderate municipalities of Cisjordan to the detriment of those controlled by the communists and mayors known for their ties with the Palestinian left.

Jordanian leaders deny that they are harboring any designs on Cisjordan, stating that they still adhere to the resolutions of the Arab "summit" in Rabat in 1974 which reaffirmed "the right of the Palestinian people to establish on every liberated territory a national, independent authority under the direction of the PLO, which is considered the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." None of the statements made by King Hussein since 1974 justify the comment--as some have made--that the Hashemite sovereign continues to be sentimentally attached to Cisjordan and that he would very much like to recover it in one way or another. At the very most, Jordanian leaders intend to assure that the choice to be made at the time desired in favor of creation of an independent Palestinian state is made with complete freedom exempt from any external pressure through the sole exercise of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. They add, however, that they would be happy if the future national Palestinian entity found it worthwhile to establish privileged ties with Jordan.

Israel's "Rampant Annexation"

In the meantime, the Jordanians are not uninterested in what is happening in occupied Cisjordan. Paradoxically, it is the selfsame brother of the Hashemite sovereign, Prince Hassan, who is often presented abroad as a partisan of a Jordan reduced to the east bank alone, who is most actively following the evolution of the situation on the west bank. The Royal Scientific Society of which he is the head has conducted many studies of the "rampant annexation" policy followed by the Israelis "to retain their control over the territory." In an article published on 25 March 1979 in the WASHINGTON POST, Prince Hassan denounced Israeli plans for "colonization and strangulation" of Cisjordan, "a policy which will only accelerate the socioeconomic devitalization" of this territory, causing a new exodus of "bitter and frustrated Palestinians" to Jordan and the Gulf countries, which can only aggravate destabilization of these regions.

The dynamic and activist policy followed by Jordan on behalf of the Palestinian cause and the inhabitants of the west bank, as well as the economic prosperity of the Hashemite kingdom, have contributed to the assuring of social peace in the country. However, recent price rises have caused "numerous recriminations" among the population, which the new austerity measures announced by the new prime minister are greatly threatening to aggravate. Sharif Abdel Hamid Charaf hopes to defuse a possible popular discontent movement by means of a policy of "dialog and meetings," designed to assure participation of the people in the affairs of the country.

For long years deprived of popularly elected representation and authorized political parties as well as of a truly independent and free press, which could have served them as an outlet, Jordanians continue to be very skeptical on the subject of the different efforts made by the palace "to democratize" the regime. The establishment in April 1979 of a National Consultative Council designed by the king has convinced no one.

In fact, the all-powerful Jordanian Intelligence Service--renowned throughout the Near East for its redoubtable efficiency--is contributing to a growing disaffection with regard to affairs of state. Upon accession to power, Sharif Abdel Hamid Charaf, the new chief of government, ordered the release of some 900 prisoners, for the most part under common law. However, reportedly nearly 200 political prisoners are in the kingdom's prisons (communists, unionists, Palestinians), including individuals who have been in prison for nearly 10 years without trial.

Charaf Gives Views

Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Mar 80 pp 7, 12

[Interview with Abdel Hamid Charaf, Jordanian prime minister, by Jean Gueyras, date and place not given]

[Text] King Hussein's new prime minister, Sharif Abdel Hamid Charaf, who last December succeeded Mudhar Badran, is not an unknown on the Jordanian political scene. A career diplomat, in 1967, at the age of 28, he had been appointed his country's ambassador to Washington before filling the position of Amman's permanent delegate to the United Nations in 1972. In 1976, King Hussein, his cousin, appointed him head of the royal cabinet. Since then he had been considered the right arm of the Hashemite sovereign, one of his most trusted counselors in the foreign affairs sector and the architect of Amman's new Near East strategy after the conclusion of the Camp David accords.

Sharif Abdel Hamid Charaf, however, had had a rather agitated past. In Beirut, where he attended the American University, the veritable breeding ground of militant Arab nationalists, he had joined the MNA (Movement of Arab Nationalists), before becoming an ardent Nasserian, which subsequently resulted in his being "placed under surveillance" by the Jordanian regime in 1958 when King Faisal of Iraq had been overthrown in Bagdad. From this "revolutionary" period of his youth, Sharif Abdel Hamid Charaf has retained principally a direct and dynamic style of action and perfect knowledge of the Palestinian problem.

On 24 December 1979, while presenting his government's program, Sharif Abdel Hamid Charaf particularly emphasized the need for assuring the "decentralization" of the country and the participation of the people in decisions affecting their daily life. Receiving us in his office of the council presidency, the Jordanian prime minister defined his conception of the idea of "decentralization," which, according to him, involved the strengthening of the powers of the various local authorities of the country, so that they can "participate more democratically" in the management of the affairs of their regions. He also wants to establish a system "for consultation and dialog so that ordinary citizens can have a voice in the conduct of their government's affairs.

[Question] Do you think it possible to assure the participation of the people in public affairs in the absence of an elected parliament?

[Answer] For us, the problem since 1967 has been that we have not been in a position to organize parliamentary elections because of the Israeli occupation of the west bank. In fact, the Constitution provides for general elections not limited to one part of the country. Since then we have studied several formulas to remedy this state of affairs, and we finally decided to postpone the functioning of the next parliament until the government is in a position to organize general elections, that is, when the occupation problem has been settled. In the meantime, we have established a National Consultative Commission--which, of course, does not replace the parliament--designed to be a provisional stage in our parliamentary life. Theoretically, according to the provisions of our Constitution, we should hold general elections as soon as possible. In the near future, we hope to draw up a plan designed to broaden popular representation.

[Question] Do you plan to authorize political parties?

[Answer] In developing countries political parties are a controversial problem. In the past, we tried the multiparty system used in some West European countries and in the United States. We reached the conclusion that developing countries should seek another formula because of their social and economic structures and particular conditions for the process of their development. However, we hope to assure greater popular participation by means of dialog with the various forces in the country.

[Question] You often speak of the need for curbing the "consumer mentality" of the people. How do you intend to attain this objective?

[Answer] That will not be an easy task. Jordan is between a rock and a hard place. On the one side there are immense pressures exerted by the Israeli expansionist threat which is forcing us to devote a large part of our resources to the imperatives of defense, and, on the other side, the great prosperity of the oil-producing countries. Some of the values of the consumer society have slipped into our social and economic life, and the people have become accustomed to asking for too much. I think the climate of softness which comes to us from the oil-producing countries has a negative effect on us: our government and our people are living beyond their means. Jordan cannot continue to confront the economic pressures resulting from oil price rises, if it does not abandon the "consumer mentality." The people must understand the need for a policy of austerity and be ready to make sacrifices. Our "easy" lifestyle only widens the gap existing between the wealthy and those less-well-off.

[Question] More than half the Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin. Do you feel that Jordan is a binational state and that the Palestinians who are living on its territory have specific national aspiration?

[Answer] Most Jordanians on the east bank were born after 1948. Therefore, it is quite difficult to say with certainty who is Jordanian and who is Palestinian in Jordan. And we are trying not to become too hung up on this point. Nor do I accept the term "binational state." Palestinians and Jordanians do not belong to different nationalities. They are holders of Jordanian passports; they are Arabs; and they have the same culture. I think we have done a lot in Jordan over the last 30 years to create a feeling here for the great national plans shared by the entire population. When the Palestinian problem is resolved, that is, when the Palestinians are able to have self-determination and the Israelis withdraw from the occupied territories, everything will be automatically settled. Those who want to live in an independent Palestinian state will be able to do so, and those who wish it will continue to be Jordanian citizens.

[Question] In 1974, Jordan gave up its rights to Cisjordan in favor of the PLO, which was designated by the Arab "summit" in Rabat as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Is this decision irreversible?

[Answer] We have not given up our rights to the west bank. The only thing we said was that we conceded the right of self-determination to the people on the west bank and to the Palestinians in general. And we are maintaining our position on this subject. What is more, that has been our attitude since 1967. In Rabat, the only thing we did was emphasize our point of view; and we recognized the PLO's responsibility in this very precise sector.

[Question] Therefore, you feel that the PLO is responsible for the fate of the west bank?

[Answer] We recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians in general. However, we believe that future arrangements within the framework of a settlement could be based on self-determination.

[Question] What is your understanding of self-determination?

[Answer] We think that all Palestinians have the right to exercise their right to decide their own future, to say whether they want a separate independent state in Cisjordan and Gaza, or whether they want a state tied with an Arab state which, incidentally, could be Jordan.

[Question] Does that mean you have not lost all hope of recovering Cisjordan?

[Answer] The term "hope" is improper. Some Jordanians think the recovery of the west bank is not a source of hope but rather of anxiety and that Cisjordan will be a burden for our country. Personally, I am not of that opinion. The Palestinian national entity must have the best relations with

Jordan, because we have many economic and cultural ties. However, we insist upon the need for application of the right to self-determination. We will never agree to assure the representation of the west bank or of the Palestinians without the express approval of the Palestinian people. Sadat, several years ago, wanted to establish a connection between the west bank and Jordan. King Hussein is for self-determination. We do not want to be accused of wishing to establish relations of hegemony or domination over Cisjordan.

We sincerely want healthy and free relations founded on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Over the last few years, intentions have been attributed to Jordan which she has never had. It was said wrongly that we were seeking an opportunity to recover the west bank and to thwart the plans of the PLO. That is totally false. Since the Arab "summit" in Rabat, we have stated on several occasions that even if all the Arab countries agreed to ask Jordan to act on behalf of the Palestinians, for our part, we would continue to demand that the Palestinian people exercise their right to self-determination.

[Question] Under what circumstances would you be prepared to participate in the Camp David process?

[Answer] Under no circumstances. We see no possibility which would justify our being a party to the Camp David formula which seems to us totally unacceptable. However, we are ready to take part in any process which would lead to the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories, recognition of Palestinian national rights, including the right to self-determination. The Camp David formula up to now has resulted in nothing but the isolation of Egypt, division of the Arab world and the conclusion of a separate peace.

[Question] Are you being subjected to American pressures to get you to participate in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations?

[Answer] We are not being subjected to any direct pressure. We explained to the Americans on several occasions and at the highest level what we thought of Camp David. They know our point of view exactly. They understood that it is not realistic to ask us to change our policy in this sector. However, we have more or less good relations with the United States.

[Question] Are you receiving American arms?

[Answer] We still have relations of a military kind with the United States.

[Question] Are you receiving sophisticated arms?

[Answer] The volume of American aid has decreased considerably. American arms are now principally being sent to Egypt. For our part, we call upon France, particularly for fighter planes. We buy armored vehicles from Great Britain and other military equipment from other Western countries.

[Question] What do you think of the situation in Afghanistan and U.S. efforts to mobilize the Arabs against the Soviet threat?

[Answer] I do not think the United States has succeeded in mobilizing the Arab countries against the USSR. The Arab countries have with reservations greeted Washington's efforts to recruit them against the USSR on the subject of Afghanistan. In fact, the United States tried to obtain the assistance of the Islamic states rather than that of the Arab countries. For our part, we are continuing to be very vigilant so as not to allow ourselves to be led down this road, for we feel that it is ridiculous to concentrate all our attention on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at a time when, for 13 years, we have had Israeli occupation of three Arab countries at our doorstep, without counting the injustice done to the Palestinians. And, yet, the Israelis are benefiting from the entire military, political and economic support of the United States. Naturally, we are against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; however, we are not acting under the influence of Washington. Also, I do not think the Americans have succeeded in turning us away from the problem which we consider primordial, namely the Israeli occupation.

[Question] If the United States modifies its position with regard to the crisis in the Near East, would you be ready to give it your assistance in its fight against the Soviets?

[Answer] No matter what the attitude of the United States may be, we feel that what the Soviets did in Afghanistan is a mistake and should be opposed. Similarly, no matter what the behavior of the Soviet in Afghanistan may be, we will continue to believe that Washington's intervention on behalf of Israel is an error. However, I must add that a substantial modification of American policy in the Near East could only improve the relations of the Arab world with the United States. However, it would be incorrect to establish a connection between what is happening in Kabul and the Near East crisis. For the problem of Afghanistan is totally different from that of Palestine. We are not taking issue with the USSR over Afghanistan because the United States wishes it but because we think Moscow's attitude is unjustifiable. It is evident that, when the United States decides to change its policy in the Near East to make it more balanced and impartial, the misunderstanding of the Arab world will disappear.

There is no problem between the Arabs and Washington other than that of the blind support furnished to Israel.

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CSO: 4800

JORDAN'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 23 Feb 80 p 7

[Interview with Jordan's Justice Minister Najib Irshaydat by Waqas Al-Tal

[Text] We all know the importance of the role played by Jordan's judicial system. Jordanians are proud of it, particularly of the fact that the system's total independence permits it to serve the cause of justice and to rectify the wrongs which, for one reason or another, befall members of our society.

We all are aware, however, that occasionally the system has been plagued by a number of problems which have prompted the judicial community and the bar association to demand that the system be restored to its former condition. Among these problems are delays and the loss of some of the system's [traditional] responsibilities.

On several occasions, AL-RA'Y has explored these problems in open debate with judges and lawyers. It raised the question of inadequate court space in Amman and al-Zarqa', the distribution of courts as well as the difficulties faced by lawyers.

Today, AL-RA'Y raises a number of these questions with Professor Najib Irshaydat, Jordan's justice minister, who expressed his willingness to answer our questions. The minister, in fact, went beyond our questions to talk about other issues bearing on the judicial system, but we refrain from reporting them here in order that judicial reform may proceed according to established procedures.

We met the minister in his Amman office at precisely 8:30 a.m. After he welcomed us, we proceeded with the interview.

[Question] What are your views on the court facilities and their distribution in Amman? Is it necessary to have all the courts in one building or should they be dispersed?

[Answer] It is important to have the courts of first instance, appeals and cassation in one building. But, because most suits brought before magistrate

courts are initiated by individuals without the help of lawyers, the ministry is planning to construct a number of these courts in heavily populated areas. In Amman these areas include the north Hashimi suburb, Marka, al-Ashrafiyyah, al-Wahadat, al-Husayn camp and the north district. There is also a plan to build a magistrate court in Suwaylen to handle cases from that town as well as from al-Baka'a camp and al-Jubayha. I favor the idea of having magistrate courts built adjacent to the recently established religious courts. Each magistrate court will be assigned a court clerk and an auditor to reduce the heavy work load of the court clerk at the Palace of Justice [central court building], and to facilitate the notarization of documents locally.

[Question] What is the status of the project for establishing appeals courts outside Amman such as Irbid and other places?

[Answer] Serious thought is being given to establishing an appeals court in Irbid. The Irbid Governorate already includes a fair number of magistrate courts as well as a court of first instance with several committees. Our surveys show that 27-30 percent of all cases brought before the Amman court of appeals originate from Irbid. We have therefore modified our plans to include an appeals court for Irbid. Similar courts will be established in other governorates as the need arises.

[Question] Are these plans to reform the judicial code with a view to speeding up trials?

[Answer] The ministry of justice has a system of priorities. Our most pressing concern is to reduce the backlog of cases throughout the country. This backlog, as I have indicated repeatedly in the past, stems from three causes: the judges, the lawyers and the law itself. The judges, however, bear the largest responsibility for the backlog. They have the legal authority to speed things up and to halt delays even by lawyers. Lawyers also bear some of the responsibility. They are supposed to cooperate fully with the court and to expedite cases in the shortest possible time. Finally, the law itself, specifically litigation procedure, carries the remainder of the responsibility. This ministry, since this government was formed, has diligently tried to reform the civil court proceedings law, the criminal court proceedings law and the law governing magistrate courts, and to establish new courts to speed up the administration of justice.

Several days ago, the justice ministry invited the country's judges to discuss the bill amending the civil court proceedings law in order to approve its final form and present it to the Cabinet and the National Consultative Council so that it may be adopted constitutionally. A committee consisting of the justice minister, the chief justices of the courts of appeal and cassation, the chief district attorneys, the deputy justice minister, justice ministry inspectors, the chief justices of the courts of first instance and the president of the bar association has met and begun reviewing the bill. The review will be completed on 1 March 1980 and the resulting document will be submitted for adoption into law.

[Question] In an announcement made sometime ago, the president of the bar association, said that his organization was anxious for greater cooperation with the justice ministry. How far will this cooperation extend?

[Answer] The bar association has cooperated and continues to cooperate well with the ministry in all matters relating to the law. It has offered good suggestions for improving the legal system. The justice ministry, since this government was formed, has reciprocated and worked to enhance this cooperation. These bridges will remain open. The bar association has shared in drafting the bill amending civil court proceedings and will participate in the reform of other components of the legal code alluded to earlier. I favor increased cooperation with the association, because according to its own charter, the bar association has a duty to participate in the legislative process and to uphold and improve the judicial system.

[Question] There is an outcry in a variety of quarters, especially among judges and lawyers, against the wide authority given to extraordinary courts at the expense of regular courts.

[Answer] One of the reasons that led to giving certain extraordinary courts jurisdiction normally reserved for the regular courts is the backlog of cases awaiting adjudication before the regular courts. By way of example, I remind you of the murder case which took place in one of our governorates. The murder victim belonged to one clan; the murderer belonged to another. The case remained unsettled for several years, and that prompted the victim's clan to murder a member of the other clan in revenge. As a result, the government was compelled to establish the major crimes court and to transfer to it many of the cases that are normally handled by courts of first instance. A variety of other cases, including fraud, bribery, misconduct by government employees, etc., were also held up in the regular courts, and, therefore, were transferred to the military court.

The ministry of justice is opposed in principle to all extraordinary and special courts, and is working hard to return judicial responsibility to the regular court system. When the legal reforms are complete and the regular courts become capable of expeditiously trying cases and settling disputes, the special courts will be abolished and full jurisdiction will be restored to the regular court system.

[Question] AL-RA'Y has frequently underscored the lack of adequate physical space in court buildings in Amman, al-Zarqa and Irbid, with all the attendant problems this creates for judges and the populace at large. We have learned that the court of appeals has been moved to a new location. Is this arrangement permanent or temporary? Do you have any suggestion for a solution?

[Answer] When the new government was formed and I was given the present position, I planned from the outset to build a new central court building in each of Amman and al-Zarqa. Following discussions with the chief justices of the Jordanian courts, I commissioned an architect to prepare plans for

the project. The plans, according to the architect, will be ready in a few weeks and construction will begin soon after that.

The present Palace of Justice has room only for the court of first instance. Consequently, we had to lease a second building to house the appeals court and the attorney general's office. This is all temporary. When the new building is ready in Amman, it will house the court of first instance as well as the courts of appeals and cassation.

I have also requested the judges in al-Zarqa to make plans for a new building, one capable of future expansion. When I hear from them I will commission an architect to prepare the actual plans. As for the other courts, the deputy minister, the justice ministry inspectors and myself will in a few weeks make an inspection tour of court buildings elsewhere in the country. Inadequate facilities will be replaced.

[Question] Does the ministry have any plans for increasing the number of clerks, researchers and administrative personnel? There are complaints that the judicial auxiliary staff is unable to cope with its responsibilities.

[Answer] Such a study is underway and its results will be known in the near future.

[Question] Are there any plans for a statute to insure not only that judges' salaries and professional obligations will be reviewed periodically but to remedy the disparity in their salaries?

[Answer] I do feel that the salaries of some judges, especially the new ones, are low. Some of them barely make 100 dinars per month. Such salaries must be improved. Furthermore, there is a large disparity between the salaries of court of cassation judges and appeals court judges, as well as between the latter and their colleagues in lower courts. We have discussed this point extensively and there are preliminary plans to raise the lower salaries to a reasonable level within our budget constraints. What is needed is to free judges' salaries from the restrictions of the civil service law. Also, some consideration is being given to add current allowances to a judge's base salary in computing his pension benefits.

[Question] What about court inspectors?

[Answer] Court inspectors constitute an important arm of the court system. One of the aims of this ministry is to upgrade and strengthen the inspection apparatus which renders an invaluable service to the ministry by reporting on judges' competence and the manner in which they run their courts.

In the future, inspectors will be free to carry out their duties independently, not upon the request of the justice minister as is the case now. The ministry also plans to send judges to study abroad and to enhance their professional competence by increasing the number of books and legal references at their disposal.

[Question] We note that the ministries of justice in other Arab countries publish a legal journal dedicated to research articles and other law-related matters. Are there any plans for such a journal here?

[Answer] We do not have that capability at present. To do that one needs specialized journalists and other resources. We do, however, cooperate with the bar association in publishing legal material. Furthermore we provide the association with court decisions which constitute legal precedents for future cases. We contribute to [the association's publication reporting these decisions] and distribute it to all courts monthly.

[Question] What is the extent of your relations with the Law School of the University of Jordan?

[Answer] There ought to be a contact and cooperation between the ministry and the law school. The ministry will undertake to establish such a relation and develop it.

9063

CSO: 4802

EEC OFFERS TO SUPPLY WHEAT TO LEBANON

Beirut L'ORIENT LE JOUR in French 26 Feb 80 p 11

[Text] At the beginning of this month, Gilbert Dupont, EEC representative in Lebanon, and Lucien Geoffroi, commercial attache in the French Embassy, submitted to Minister of Economy and Trade Talal Merhabi an offer for the supplying of 1 million tons of wheat to Lebanon over a period of 5 years.

It has been learned that the offer, which is from the National Union of Agricultural Grain Cooperatives (UNCAC) (Paris), is matched by a series of facilities that countries belonging to the EEC would be willing to grant to Lebanon, including: a gift of a minimum of 20,000 tons of wheat; agricultural and technical assistance; upon the request of the ministry, direct delivery to the ports of Tripoli and Saida a quantity of exported wheat, which will save reloading charges; an all-risk guarantee (including war) on the order of 2 percent of the sales price, or \$4 million; the possibility of distributing storage throughout the regions of Lebanon by means of the construction of prefabricated silos. In addition, Dupont, the EEC representative, was willing to meet with experts from the Grain and Sugar Beet Office in order to discuss with them the contents of the proposed contract. Finally, the EEC offer hints of the possibility of ensuring the delivery of any quality of wheat that Lebanon wants.

Nevertheless, despite the advantage accompanying the offer, it would appear that it has not yet been seriously examined by the Ministry of Economy and Trade.

In this connection, well-informed sources indicate that the offer, along with an American offer, were reportedly the source of disagreement within the Council of Ministers. In fact, although certain ministers chose renewal of the agreement with the Canadian Wheat Office, others opposed it, asking that Lebanon have recourse to several suppliers rather than only one. Also within this context, an official from the Ministry of Economy and Trade revealed that the freezing of American assistance stemming from BL 480 is attributable to the Lebanese Government's refusal of an American offer to sell 200,000 tons of wheat because of Lebanon's agreement with Canada.

Advantages and Disadvantages

In addition, concerning the offer from the Canadian Wheat-Agro Office, which seems likely to be accepted, sources close to UNCAC say that not only does the offer lack the advantages contained in the one from the Common Market, but in addition, it may cause the Treasury a loss of nearly \$3 million. In fact, even if Lebanon should opt for Canadian wheat, the EEC would be willing to supply the same quality more cheaply, which would represent a savings of \$3 million compared with the Canadian offer. If Lebanon should choose European wheat, the savings would be nearly \$10 million. Furthermore, while the delivery costs are \$1.50 per ton of wheat for the European offer, they are \$3.94 for the Canadian offer. Moreover, while the amount of the European guarantee is \$4 million, as stated above, the Canadian guarantee would not exceed 10,000 Lebanese pounds. Finally, the European offer ensures delivery 12 months out of the year, while the Canadian offer is limited to 5 months due to the blockage of Canadian ports by the freezing of the Saint Lawrence River.

11,464

CSO: 4800

MINISTER DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT'S CREDIT POLICY

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 14 Feb 80 pp 1,3

[Article carrying the official imprint of the Ministry in Charge of Standing Affairs of the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN for 'Comite Militaire de Salut National'): "The Government's Credit Policy: To Give Back to Credit Its Meaning"]

[Text] An essential mechanism of economic management, credit is an indispensable command lever without which it is illusory to conceive of an independent economic development policy. Working from this principle it is possible to correctly assess the value of the creation of a national monetary system in 1973, which made those in charge of the money system the sole determinants of the credits distributed and of the priority sectors which can benefit therefrom.

From there one can hope to see in operation a real economic development policy where the State's borrowing capacity and the channeling of savings are mustered to finance investments which in themselves generate added value, which in turn is translated into an improvement of the standard of living of the Mauritanian people.

The results obtained in the last few years, however, have not by a long shot been equal to the hopes engendered in spite of a spectacular climb in the volume of credit approved by the banking establishments in the last few years. The total absence of managerial structures, the embezzlement of credit and the mental frame of economic speculators, have been the main causes of the situation that prevails today.

Present Situation

The easy distribution of credit in the name of free choices, of a liberal type of policy, has encouraged speculations in those sectors that can bring immediate profit, such as trade and real estate speculations, which bring in their train a stimulated consumption and a swollen volume of imports. This has contributed largely to the deterioration of the balance of payments and heated up the inflationary tendencies.

Worse yet, the new class of Mauritanian businessmen who have gotten fat off the banks has been selected, with very few exceptions, from the ranks of political clients. As a result, these tend to consider the easy credits granted them to be the prices of services rendered and therefore a sort of given right that is owed them. The pledges given to the banks being formalities only thus become dead letter in the form of sleeping liabilities which accumulate day after day due to the process of banking add-on.

The exhaustion of liquid money in the banks leaves no other choices for the prime banking institutions than the resort to possibilities offered by the mint while waiting for better days. Thus we have in schematic form a description of the effects of the credit policies put in practice in the last few years.

The Remedies

The effects of such credit policies were one part of the heavy burden left as heritage to the Armed Forces when they took power on 10 July 1978. And as an aspect of the general economic situation, its solution depended on the success of the economic and financial recovery plan put in operation by the central direction of the country.

The moderate extension of credit to businesses and individuals, recorded in 1978, represented a reflexion of the measures adopted since 10 July and put into application in view of bringing back the rate of credit expansion down to a rhythm commensurate with the evolution of economic activities of the country. Indeed, from December 1977 to December 1978, the total commitment of credit registered at the Central Bank went up only by 664 million UM, or 9.2 percent, whereas the increase registered in the previous 12 months was 1,420 million UM, representing an increase of 24.4 percent.*

In 1979 the volume of credit registered reaches 10,310,000,000 ouguiya. The increase as compared to 1978, 12 percent, has been maintained within the reasonable limits permitted by normal economic activities.

The share of the private sector amounts to 8,800,000,000 UM in short and middle term credit.

The general tightening of credit registered since 1978 comes within the framework of the new credit policy decided by the Central Bank in application of the directives of the Military Committee for National Salvation. This new policy is willed to be restrictive and selective by the persons in charge at the mint.

It must be restrictive because it will take into consideration:

* See annual report of BCM Banque Centrale de la Mauritanie, Central Mauritanian Bank for 1978.

- 1) the deficit in the balance of payments
- 2) the situation of the public treasury
- 3) the regular supply needs of the market
- 4) the need to prevent inflationary tendencies.

Finally, it must be selective in the sense that it must define more rigorously the priority areas. It nonetheless remains, though, that the rural sector has very limited capacities of absorbing credit in function of its lack of attractive projects. This remains to be an important handicap which deserves to be studied in depth by the government people. It is no less true, however, that the monetary issue institute will see to it that the middle term credits will serve primarily to finance investments in the three sectors of agri-pastoral, small industry and fishing business.

At the same time the Central Mauritanian Bank will from now on work hard on making the control of credit be rigorously respected through the following main instruments:

- 1) the ceiling of semester rediscount depending on the bank
- 2) the fixing of individual limits to rediscount by customer
- 3) the securing of previous authorization.

The new policy thus defined is well and good a translation into the facts of the matter of the directives decided upon by the Military Committee for National Salvation within the framework of the general recovery program drawn up in its second to last ordinary session. It goes without saying that it will run into obstacles caused by:

- 1) the lack of a support system to assist the economic operators
- 2) the merchant mentality of Mauritanians
- 3) back debts still owed to the banks.

Support Structures

Support here means above all the structuring of business advice and studies meant to assist the businessmen. One must remember to note in this regard that the Military Committee for National Salvation has already decided upon the principle of an industrial promotion institute which will be charged with identifying and studying those projects that are profitable and therefore can interest the businessmen. This is a good initiative which will help fill up a void because until now our businessmen have been left to fend for themselves without any technical assistance from anyone.

Because of that they naturally went into the field traditionally known best to the Mauritanian, general trade where the risks are primarily borne by the consumer. It is this which explains in large measure the lack of interest shown for industrial projects and agricultural exploitation.

This role of advisor can equally be left to the banks which theoretically

have their own credit services and are capable of giving assistance to their clients by directing them towards the projects that guarantee the maximum level of success.

It is moreover indispensable to create quickly the national development funds which in principle has already been decided by the Military Committee for National Salvation, and also to free the commercial banks from the constraints that normally should not shackle them. For a commercial bank is by definition an institution created for the purpose of making immediate profits. A banking loan therefore is a short term one involving minimal risks for the bank and maximum profit. Only a development fund having substantial means at its disposal can answer the requirements that come with development project.

All that would still not be enough. For at a later date following the investment it will be necessary to have the conditions necessary for the sale of products, that will assure them either protection or a sale price that is compatible with the manufacturing cost of production.

The Businessmen

We have above stressed the responsibility of the state in defense of the businessmen, but these are by no means beyond reproach. Their responsibilities come from bad habits, from a tendency to seek easy jobs, and from a complacent system which they have always benefited from. The Mauritanian businessman is first of all a merchant, this is something that one cannot blame him for. On the other hand, it cannot be accepted that they engage in activities that are equivalent to swindling. In this categories one should mention the embezzlement of credit which happens all too commonly. One contracts a loan on the basis of an investment file that more often than not benefits from the stimulative clauses of the investment code and in the name of a legal entity, but once the credit has been granted it is used to buy luxury products, to finance the construction of villas and to purchase cattle, etc.

The legal entity becomes bankrupt in undeclared fashion but the actual person prospers and sometimes even goes on founding other societies using borrowed names. The bank finds itself with debts that will never be collected and mortgages that it will never be able to touch for various reasons.

An end must be put to this through on-site control and the control of stocks by the banks, a continued observation of the behavior of the loan beneficiary, but especially through the selection of serious businessmen who respect their word and who are conscious of the risks that come with a loan contract.

The complacency of the bankers and the interventions of high level personnel have largely contributed to this situation.

The Banks' Back Debts

These back debts have cut deeply into the liquid assets of the primary banking institutions. These no longer know what to do with their sleeping debts. Yet a primary banking institution is first of all an intermediary between a unit having a surplus and one having a deficit, in other words it normally should be self-sufficient in terms of its own deposits.

In actuality, the primary banks in Mauritania have lost this role a long time ago and they have made the Central Mauritanian Bank their constant bailout, which is no longer normal.

No doubt, the primary banks today are in a catastrophic situation, which calls for vigorous measures and setting up of follow-up and control structures. They must in particular envision the creation of real estate management societies which will take hold of the mortgaged buildings and find a quick solution to taking care of their mortgages.

They must make sure that the credits granted are used for the purposes for which they were meant, they must also make in such a way that the deposit system becomes general. Those are all urgent measures that it is indispensable to take so that the banks recover their role and in order that the credit system has the effects we want.

In other words, the credit policy is part and parcel of a whole package and as such it must be integrated in an all-encompassing economic policy.

1751
CSO: 4400

NEGOTIATIONS MUST NOT SACRIFICE BASIC INTERESTS

Casablanca L'AVANT GARDE in French 16 Feb 80 pp 1, 3

[Editorial: "That Which Is Not Negotiable"]

[Text] Over the past few days, persistent rumors, perhaps intentionally fostered, have been circulated about negotiations that are in progress or are being planned regarding the Sahara.

Certain newspapers, champions at amplifying all news distilled by the foreign media which is often timely, and subject to evident pressure or indoctrination, help to corroborate these rumors.

In the salons of some upstarts who do not hide their defeatism, these rumors are avidly accepted and are then passed on with zeal and many changes.

Thus they make much of the Algerian-Moroccan contacts, of the imminent summit meetings, etc.

In the meantime, contrary to the solemn promise given by the authorities that they would always keep the public up-to-date on developments that in any way touch upon this matter, one notices that the silence and at times the terseness of the authorities reinforces the rumors.

Certainly the method of controlled indiscretions and of deliberate leaks sometimes gives excellent results, but only within the framework of an overall news policy which does not allow for mistakes or improvisations, and which does not tolerate any irresponsibility.

But since this does not seem to be the case at all, let us hasten to say that such rumors can also be harmful and can have the effect of demobilizing.

But let us especially hasten to point out that which cannot be discussed but which every Moroccan, though not sharing the secrets of the powers that be, must keep in mind:

Any negotiation, if there is negotiation, must start from some simple preconditions:

1. The unity and the integrity of the Moroccan territory are not negotiable.
2. The national sovereignty is not negotiable and must not allow for any restrictions or nuances. Any compromise in this regard will start the process of destruction and the amputation of the country all over again.
3. The justice of our cause is not to be used for power struggles, and any solution forced on the country is doomed to failure.

Having said this, we must remain open to the only reasonable negotiation which must set out to answer the following question:

In order to go beyond the present artificial tension, how can we undertake, as soon as possible, the edification of the Arabian maghreb totally removed from the wishes of outsiders and from the interplay of the super-powers?

History will judge us by the answer we will give to that question.

9465

CSO: 4400

INDUSTRIAL, TRADE FIGURES FOR 1979 REVIEWED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 22 Feb 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mustapha Sehim: "The First Assessment of 1979"]

[Text] The overall trends observed in 1979 confirm those observed in 1978 in the industrial sector. Most areas have shown an increase in production. Only in the automobile industry and in that of machine manufacture has there been a significant drop.

In particular with regard to automobile production, the drop was on the order of 40 percent: 4,734 vehicles in 1978 as opposed to 2,852 in 1979. As for private cars, the drop is of about 7 percent: 18,338 in 1979 compared to 19,684 in the previous year. The situation in the machine industries is equally worrying. The reason is simple: a marked reduction in the state's effort regarding equipment.

The fact remains that, in spite of everything, according to the latest estimates the increased worth of the industrial sector is supposed to be 5 percent over that of 1978. This increase was caused in particular by the "good management" in the agriculture, food, cement, and fertilizer industries.

Cement: +17.8 Percent

The production of cement was on the order of 2.8 million tons in 1978. During the past year it reached 3.3 million tons, an increase of 17.8 percent. This increase is due to the cement works of Oriental and Temara, which started production recently. Cement imports fell immediately by 55 percent: in fact, they went from 676,000 tons in 1978 to 308,000 tons in 1979. However, the total consumption of cement increased from one year to the next: 3.6 million tons in 1979 compared to 3.478 million tons in 1978.

Sugar: -10.5 Percent

On the whole, the sugar industry was satisfactory. Without reaching the exceptional results of 1978, which would have been possible without bad

weather conditions, it exceeded 2 million tons (2,093,000 tons compared to 2,288,000 tons in 1978, to be exact), of processed tonnage of sugar-beet. The corresponding production of sugar was of 309,000 tons as against 345,500 tons in 1978, or a drop of 10.5 percent. It is also worth noting that the domestic market for sugar has hardly changed: it is holding at the same level as last year with a volume of 592,000 tons.

With regard to other branches of industry, one must mention the good management in textile exports with an appreciable recovery in the clothing industry. As for the branches in agriculture and industry, they have experienced an improvement in their supplies. Progress was also noticed with regard to peaches.

Drop in Industrial Investments

The trend recorded in 1978 was confirmed in 1979: it is that of a drop in industrial investments. In fact, the investments encouraged during the first 6 months of 1979 reached only 776 million dirhams against 1,058 million dirhams for the corresponding period in 1978. Thus, the drop is on the order of 27 percent.

Hence, the jobs created were not many: only 14,658 in 1979 against 21,146 in 1978, or a drop of 31 percent. The structural analysis of these investments shows a drop in public industrial investments since 1977. It also shows a drop in the machine industry (-42 percent in 1979), in chemistry (-25 percent), and in textiles (-40 percent), in return, investments in the agricultural industry rose by 7 percent.

Foreign Exchange Deficit Deterioration

The year 1979 was marked by a deterioration of our foreign exchange deficit: in fact, it went from 6.1 billion dirhams in 1978 to over 7 billion for the past year, or a worsening by 14 percent.

The guaranteed rate for trade stayed at about 50 percent (50.6 percent in 1978 as opposed to 50.9 percent in 1979). This is because of a 15.8 percent rise over 1978 imports, and also a 15.4 percent rise in exports. This unfavorable development for foreign trade, regarding imports, is due to different factors: the rise in the price of oil, a rise in the importation of certain raw materials (sulfur, etc.), supplies for the local market (sugar, milk...), inflation in food prices (wheat), and in the price of equipment and of certain in-between products (fertilizers). With regard to exports, one must point out the drop in value (-9 percent) and in tonnage of phosphate exports.

The persistence of this trade imbalance is still a worry. It implies a need for an overall policy for promoting exports and especially the means to do it.

9465

CSO: 4400

ON STOPPING SCHOLARSHIPS TO STRIKING STUDENTS

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 22 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmed Alaoui: "War and Strike"]

[Text] We have often dealt with problems regarding education and the reforms that are necessary; we paid tribute to the new minister of national education who is aware of the need for these reforms. But all reforms could only be progressive in time and space.

We have also written critiques on certain options. We defended the rights and the freedom to act of the students at the university, we supported their participation in the management of all that concerns them; we asked that the scholarships be given to the majority of students, which was done.

We have always shown objectivity, and we never built a case based on intentions and not on facts, not against the teachers or the students, nor against the national Ministry of Education.

While recognizing the rights of the union to free expression and to strike, we expressed our opposition to the abuse of that right which should be used only as a last resort, considering the harm it can do.

In any event, to strike for the maximum amount of time should only be done when needed for the defense of the material and moral interests of the students, for the support of concrete claims, and let us emphasize, for academic claims. For it is important that the university stay out of politics.

But What Does One See?

We see a minority of students undertaking a campaign of agitation, who do not shrink from violence, and use any pretext available. That is how, out of 15,000 students 500 get together and out of that group about 100 make the decision in the name of all. This is a deception and a dictatorship. The decision to strike, if it is made, must come from the majority during a regular meeting.

The grounds for setting these strikes in motion are even more abnormal. The first movement was organized to commemorate the ban on the UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students], whereas that organization had been legalized again. Then, to keep the momentum going at all costs, demagoguery was used to order a strike protesting the establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel, a strike that is detrimental to Morocco, and an issue that did not matter to the interested parties in the least.

That is why the medical faculty in Casablanca is on strike since 24 January, and why there is agitation of similar magnitude at the engineering school of Mohammedia.

Such behavior causes serious hardship to the national community and to the students themselves whose education is in jeopardy. It is all the more scandalous since these students are supported by the whole nation which is making enormous sacrifices for them: the total amount of scholarships given for the current year is 43 billion earmarked for 80,000 students.

But these scholarships are granted so that the students may study, and not that they go on strike. Hence, it is logical and usual to suspend these grants. Workers on strike are not paid. Why then give special privileges to the students?

One had the right to expect a higher sense of responsibility in a university where the future officials of the nation are being trained. We who have supported the legitimate demands of the students, are quite willing to denounce these anti-national strikes. In fact, the university tends to become the center of left-wing agitation and of anti-national activities, and this is done by the privileged ones who live off the sacrifices the state and the national community agrees to make for them.

And during this time, our soldiers heroically defend the national soil. Some give their lives in order to defend the very rights of these students. The mobilization of the nation concerns not only the army, but the nation as a whole and the youth in particular. At this point, we are sorry to note that some, through their excesses, their lack of responsibility, and their blindness, play into the hands of our opponents and behave like accomplices of our enemies and of the separatists to the extent that one could ask whether this active and violent minority manipulating the student body is not itself being manipulated from abroad.

9465

CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE -- Qatari Minister of Commerce and Economy Shaykh Nasir ibn Khalid Al Thani and French Minister of Foreign Trade Francois Deniau signed a protocol for cooperation in the field of development of agricultural relations between the two countries. The purpose of the agreement is to support cooperation in the fields of irrigation, utilization of flowing water, and mechanization to develop the raising of livestock, agriculture, and afforestation. The two sides will cooperate to increase the production of vegetables and grains in Qatar, and France will offer suggestions for the construction of silos. The two sides will form a joint technical committee to lay down fundamentals for the execution of the provisions of the agreement. [Excerpts] [Doha AL-'URUBAH in Arabic 13 Mar 80 p 8]

EDUCATION STATISTICS--There are 37,648 students enrolled in all grades of education in Qatar, of whom 30,309 are in the Doha schools. Of these students, 19,361 are male and 11,281 female. [Excerpts] [Doha AL-'AHD in Arabic 11 Mar 80 p 5]

CSO: 4802

BOURGUIBA ESTABLISHES NEW ADVISORY COUNCIL

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Mar 80 pp 1, 4

[Statement by Mohamed Sayah, director of the party and minister delegate to the Office of Prime Minister, 8 March]

[Text] Following the meeting of the Political Bureau held yesterday morning, Mohamed Sayah, director of the party and minister delegate attached to the Office of Prime Minister, made the following statement:

On the morning of 8 March 1980, the Supreme Commander, President Habib Bourguiba, presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau at Carthage Palace.

At the beginning of its session, the Political Bureau heard the directives of the Supreme Commander, who recalled the principles and values on which he has based his action in guiding the nation throughout the battle for liberation and the phase of building the government and consolidating the foundations for overall development. The chief of state emphasized that he has always been concerned with ensuring a unified voice, cohesion in the ranks and openness to all constructive energies and enlightened competency on the basis of loyalty, sincerity, respect for the government and its constitutional institutions and the commitment of everyone to assume his responsibility for preserving Tunisia and its independence and guaranteeing its invulnerability.

The Supreme Commander expressed his satisfaction over the attitude adopted under the present circumstances by the Tunisian people, who have manifested their unity as they have always done in all phases of the struggle.

It was, in fact, thanks to the unity of the people that Tunisia has won its victories. This unity remains the best shield, enabling it to meet every test. In addition, he stated that the PDS [Destourian Socialist Party] is the party of all Tunisians, within which they find an opportunity for effort and sacrifice and a broad platform in which sincere dialog remains the best crucible in which the people's strength and energies may be deployed.

In conclusion, the Supreme Commander reassured members of the Political Bureau about the state of health of his comrade in struggle, Hedi Nouira, prime minister and secretary general of the party, and expressed wishes for his prompt recovery.

In accordance with the wishes of the president of the party and Supreme Commander, Habib Bourguiba, the Political Bureau made the following decisions:

1) The establishment of an advisory council of members, provided for by Article 20 of the bylaws, and the appointment of Bechir Zarg Layoun as chairman. The members are: Haj Bechir Ben Fadhel (Menzel Temime); Ahmed Senoussi (Gafsa); Mohamed Glenzo; Mahmoud El-Kefi (Beja); Boubakar Bakir (Bizerte); Jellouli Fares (Hamma de Gabes); Mohamed Guennouni (Ksar Hellal); Taieb Tekaya (Menzel Bourguiba); Mohamed Ben Othman (Tunis); Laajimi Ben Mabrouk (Sidi Amor Boujella); Hassen Ben Abdelaziz (Ouerdanine); Mekki Grissiaa (Ben Guerdane); Bechir Bellagha (Tunis); Habib Ben Mohamed Lahbib (Mateur); Mahjoub Ben Ali (Tunis); Khelifa Houas (Kerkennah); Amara Slougha (Sidi Bouzid); Nouri Boudali (le Kef); Abdallah Chaouch (le Kef); Sassi Lassoued (Hamma de Gabes); and Cheikh Toumi Ben Ahmed (Cheneni-Gabes).

Inasmuch as Article 20 stipulates that the Political Bureau is to consult members of the advisory council of members, Bechir Zarg Layoun will take part in the work of the Political Bureau and will attend its meetings.

2) Annulment of the decision made by the Political Bureau in March 1950 regarding Dr Slimane Ben Slimane and his exclusion from the party because of his political positions which, at that time, were not in keeping with the national cause and the political strategy adopted by the party in order to liberate the country. By virtue of the reversal of that decision, Dr Slimane Ben Slimane is rehabilitated and resumes his rightful place in the party. Consequently, he will enjoy the consideration and respect of members, as the result of his uprightness, high moral values, the services he has rendered and the sacrifices he made in the liberation struggle.

3) Lifting of the decision of 21 January 1972, excluding Ahmed Mestiri from the party, and the decision of 10 March 1974 concerning the suspension of the activities of Mrs Radhja Haddad in the party, as well as the decision made by the Ninth Congress of the party in September 1974 to expel Beji Caid Essebsi, Mohamed Ben Amara, Hassib Ben Ammar, Sadok Ben Jemaa, Habib Boulares, Mohamed Salah Belhaj and Mohamed Moadia.

By virtue of the lifting of these decisions, the persons named regain their rights as active members of the party.

4) The establishment of standing committees within the party leadership and the appointment of their secretaries from among the Central Committee. They are: Slaheddine Ben Hamida, secretary of the orientation committee; Mekki Aloui, secretary of the party internal organization committee;

Hamadi Khouini, secretary of the cadre training committee; Nouredine Ktari, secretary of the economic development committee; Rachid Chatty, secretary of the social advancement committee; Amor Belkhiria, secretary of the information committee; Bechir Ben Slama, secretary of the cultural committee; Mustapha M'nif, secretary of the committee on education and university affairs; and Moncef Slama, secretary of the foreign relations committee.

Advisory Council of Members

Bechir Zarg Layoun (chairman); Haj Bechir Ben Fadhel (Menzel Temime); Ahmed Senoussi (Gafsa); Mohamed Glenza (Gafsa); Mahmoud El Kefi (Beja); Boubaker Bakir (Bizerte); Jallouli Fares (Hamma de Gabes); Mohamed Guennouni (Ksar Hellel); Taieb Tekaya (Menzel Bourguiba); Mohamed Ben Othmane (Tunis); Laajimi Ben Mabrouk (Sidi Amor Bouhajla); Hassen Ben Abdelaziz (Ouerdanine); Mekki Grissia (Ben Guerdane); Bechir Bellagha (Tunis); Habib Ben Mohamed Lahbib (Mateur); Mahjoub Ben Ali (Tunis); Khelifa Houas (Kerkennah); Amara Slougha (Sidi Bouzid); Nouri Boudali (Le Kef); Sassi Lassoued (Hamma de Gabes); Cheikh Toumi Ben Ahmed (Chenini-Gabes).

Lifting of Expulsion

The Political Bureau has decided to reverse the expulsion of the following: Slimane Ben Slimane, Ahmed Mestiri, Mrs Radhia Haddad, Beji Caid Essebsi, Mohamed Ben Amara, Hassib Ben Ammar, Sadok Ben Jomaa, Habib Boulares, Mohamed Salah Belhaj and Mohamed Moadia.

Important Decisions of Supreme Commander; New Members of Political Bureau

The Political Bureau published the following bulletin yesterday:

"In keeping with Article 18 of the party's bylaws, the president of the party, Supreme Commander Habib Bourguiba has appointed Mahmoud Charchour, member of the Central Committee, as member of the Political Bureau, replacing Dr Chedli Ben Jaafar. The president of the party also named Tijani Makni, member of the Central Committee, as member of the Political Bureau, replacing Ali Sellami."

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TUNISIA

UNDP AGREEMENT SIGNED TO DEVELOP ARID AREAS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 8 Mar 80 p 4

[Article: "Agreement on the Project to Develop Tunisia's Arid Zones Signed"]

[Text] Messrs Lassaad Ben Osman, minister of agriculture, and Bradford Morse, director of the UNDP, in the office of the Ministry of Agriculture yesterday morning took the action of signing an agreement on the project to develop Tunisia's arid zones.

This project, which will be implemented by FAO in cooperation with the Tunisian government and to which the UNDP is contributing the amount of \$966,500, takes on tremendous significance for the nation's economy, considering the goals that have been assigned to it.

The significance stems from the close relationship between the project's goals and Tunisia's development priorities, especially with regard to regional balance. This project, which will make it possible to speed up the development of the country's south, an area blessed little by natural circumstances, can be considered as a continuation of the activity that has been undertaken in this field for close to 20 years in collaboration with the UNDP.

It must be pointed out that, in its current phase, the project seeks to improve and develop the pilot assistance areas by applying the results of the research and studies carried out by the UNDP.

These pilot projects should emerge as large-scale development programs of the arid zones.

On this occasion, Mr Ben Osman stated that he was satisfied and happy with the signing of this agreement on behalf of the Tunisian Government.

"The choice of this project is very important," he indicated in particular, "seeing that it will make it possible to continue the development activity in the country's south. I hope that this agreement will be followed by others so that our effort to develop the arid zones is successful."

Mr Morse in turn hailed the development efforts undertaken by the Tunisian Government under the aegis of the supreme warrior, President Bourguiba.

"I want to express here," he said in particular, "how much confidence I have as far as the success of these efforts is concerned." He concluded by saying, "I also want to thank the Tunisian Government and especially the departments of Agriculture and Planning, as well as the Institute for Arid Zones, for the excellent cooperation that exists between these offices and the UNDP.

Mr Jamil Mohamed Hamdi, the UN's resident representative in Tunis, was present at the signing ceremony.

Beforehand Mr Lassaad Ben Osman held a lengthy discussion with Mr Morse in his office on the prospects for cooperation between the UNDP and the Tunisian Government, particularly in the area of agriculture.

The discussion took place in the presence of several top staff members from the Ministry of Agriculture and Mr Jamil Hamdi.

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CSO: 4400

EDITORIAL EXAMINES FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PLO RIGHTS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 8 Mar 80 [page not given]

[Editorial: "A Maneuver?"]

[Text] France's recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, reiterated in Abu Dhabi, has visibly opened a large breach in the process provided for by the Camp David accords. This is the impression one gains from recent statements made by the Egyptian prime minister in Paris.

At a time when several European countries join the French position, at a time when everything points to a unified, effective attitude emanating from the EEC, the Egyptian prime minister actually stated that he "totally approved" of the French move. However, the Egyptian prime minister did not fail to note that negotiations on "autonomy" between his country and Israel will be continued until their conclusion, and he did not conceal his hope that he would one day see the people of Trans-Jordan and Gaza ratify the solution "proposed to them. The contradiction is a flagrant one. How can one, in fact, simultaneously support the position of administrative autonomy -- in sum, Israeli tutelage -- contained in the Camp David accords and the self-determination of the people of Palestine -- that is, their real independence -- defended from the very beginning by Arab countries and the African and European nations enamored of peace and justice?

At any rate, Egypt cannot truly approve the French position without displeasing the Israelis and above all, without contradicting itself -- that is, disavowing the policy that pushed it to sign the Camp David accords.

Is it then just a simple maneuver? Egypt seems to have chosen to move closer to France at a time when the latter risked breaking up the Camp David peace process. The sole purpose of Khalil's formula could therefore be to make Egypt get on the band wagon, with the faint and distant hope of bringing France into the negotiations on autonomy.

But here again, the basic concepts are far from agreement. The right to self-determination reaffirmed by the Arab countries and France is far from agreeing with the so-called autonomy that will be proposed to the Palestinians in Trans-Jordan and Gaza.

The Egyptian plan would therefore be quite simply doomed to failure. At any rate, one thing is certain: Egypt is no longer pursuing the talks on autonomy with so much conviction. The reason is simple: It no longer believes in them.

COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH BULGARIA SIGNED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 8 Mar 80 p 4

[Article: "Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Program Signed"]

[Text] Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, the managing director of International Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Dimitrov Philipov, vice president of the Bulgarian Cultural Committee, early yesterday afternoon signed a program for cultural and scientific cooperation between Tunisia and Bulgaria for the years 1980-81.

This program corresponds to the desire of both countries to increase and intensify bilateral relations in the fields of science, culture, education, and the arts, in conformance with the cooperative agreement reached between Tunisia and Bulgaria on 10 February 1965.

The cooperative program provides for the exchange of delegations, information, and experience in the areas of training, of higher education and scientific research, and of culture (music, theatre, cinema, archeology, and libraries), as well as with regard to data, youth, and sports.

During the signing ceremony, Messrs Ben Arfa and Philipov pointed out that this program amounts to a new step in the direction of increased Tunisian-Bulgarian cooperation, cooperation that has continuously moved forward based on friendship and mutual understanding.

In addition, Mr Ben Arfa pointed out the variety and progress in the exchanges between the two countries to the satisfaction of both parties.

In this respect, Mr Ben Arfa paid homage to the activities carried out by the program's Bulgarian participants in various sectors of the country's life. Tunisian-Bulgarian cooperation has, he said, developed in a positive manner; the best proof of this is the success of the Cultural Week in Tunisia.

He also expressed the desire to see such cooperation further increased. Mr Ben Arfa concluded by pointing out that the Bulgarian delegation certainly had realized during its visit, the high degree of development

Tunisia has achieved in all areas under the clear-sighted policy of President Bourguiba and his desire to continue his effort in this direction in spite of the endeavors of some to impede his progress.

For his part, Mr Philipov stressed the stability of the relations established between the two countries. He also indicated that the implementation of the bilateral cooperative program corresponds to Presidents Habib Bourguiba and Todor Divkov's desire to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two nations based on a foundation of mutual respect.

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